Take Heart oh Christian! Victory is Assured!
Upholding the Constitutional Acts of Great Britain
with their Association with an Oath from the present Monarch to suppress Utilitarian Global approaches that are completely contrary to the customs and laws of our nation.
Here we present a "Constitutional Breach Notice" against one of Britain's largest financial institutions, the notice issued being in line with rights given to Clergy of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law in the 1534/59 Act of Supremacy.
Notice of Constitutional Breach in relation to the Way Barclaycard has conducted itself in relation to Card. 5301 2710 1411 1001
Formerly5505 3430 0182 7271
Dated 07. February 2014
Under the powers granted to Ministers of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established By Law I hereby serve on Barclaycard, Barclays Bank PLC, 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP with copies to the Prudential Regulation Authority, Financial Conduct Authority & Experian on behalf of all Credit Reference Agencies this “Notice of Constitutional Breach”.
Explanation: The 1534 Act of Supremacy gives clear authority to those upholding the Constitution to ensure the peace of the realm is upheld, also that foreign law and regulation has not infiltrated legal affairs in our nation. Ministers of the State Religion have examined this case and believe there has been serious breaches by Barclaycard in the conducts of its affairs relating to this case. Every attempt has been made by Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths to try and negotiate with Barclaycard to no avail, hence this “Notice of Constitutional Breach.”
The 1689 Act establishing the Coronation Oath, sworn by our present Monarch in 1953 emphasizes the rights given to clergy of the Protestant Reformed Religion established by Lawin relation to maintaining the statutes, laws and customs of the realm that must according to the 1534 Act re-established by Queen Elizabeth I in 1559 have no foreign influences involved in the legal processes at all. We believe in this matter we can prove many such influences both in law and philosophical approaches illegal under British Law.
The 1689 Act also establishes that all law must be applied with law and justice in mercy. We believe we despite of serious harassment by Barclaycard have tried to have sensible dialogue throughout that has not been forthcoming by those who were once defendants.
5 Breaches of the Constitutional Acts.
BREACH 1: We stopped paying the now alleged account on 28. April 2009 after the House of Lords had given clear intimation in relation to how such accounts were to be conducted by banks. In the view of MSB Solicitors of Liverpool, their case No. JC/SA/48744.008Barclaycard had not conducted themselves in the way the House of Lords had clearly demanded. On the 28. April, 2009 a notice was issued by MSB Solicitors of Liverpool considering the agreement as it stands unenforceable by virtue of Section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit and/or Section 78/77 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. A dispute was clearly established and so to proceed against a claimant under such circumstances we are establishing as the first breach.
BREACH 2: Harassment of a claimant & perverting the course of justice. We endured considerable harassment from Mercers & Calders (both seemingly owned by Barclays) & so in our view Barclaycard perverted the course of justice by changing identity with a court hearing on the way at that time. Seriously illegal in my view.
They then passed the now alleged account to Debt Managers Ltd. On 6. January 2010 they recognised an ongoing dispute with a return of the now alleged account to Barclays. The harassment has returned with a letter dated 31. January 2014 threatening to default an account already defaulted by Mercers on 26. July, 2009.
We believe the inaccuracy of the letter of 31. January clearly proves Barclaycard’s inability to keep proper records, a point originally proven by MSB Solicitors and the point the House of Lords was dealing with in their discussions about banking practices in Britain.
The House of Lords constitutionally were looking to protect consumers from bad banking practices and we believe in line with their original edict on these matters we have proven serious malpractice by Barclaycard destroying the financial reputation of Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths that without the protection of Britain’s Constitutional Acts she would have no comeback. The original default notice related to an amount of £4,501-64, the new threat to default - £4,840-64 – two defaults with two differing amounts!!!!!!
BREACH 3: Habeas Corpus or Corpus Juris? Another apparent Barclaycard agency Calder were asked the question on 28. July 2009 whether they operated through Habeas Corpus or Corpus Juris. If they were operating through Habeas Corpus, the principle that if a case is on the way to court then the court decision would be waited for before proceeding, yet they and their other two apparent Barclaycard agencies continued to harass, threaten and use unusual methods so as to bring pain to a claimant.
On 9. August 2009 there was a threat from Mercers to send a local debt collector which did not happen, that threat occurring whilst the case was due for court. In the processes leading up to a court hearing a process of using social stationery was used by Mercers in their attempt to get payment on a now alleged account going to court.
On 29. October whilst the case was on its way to court Calder threatened summons, bailiffs, taking money out of wages, local collector & an adverse credit rating. Only the latter has happened resulting in a huge restriction on the trading ability of Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths.
On the 9. November 2009 in amidst horrendous harassment from the agencies of Barclaycard on a claimant, we received notice from MSB Solicitors, Liverpool of positive court developments yet on 23. November 2009 Barclaycard issued an over-limit charge on the now alleged account at a time when the card had not been used! It is at this point that a letter was written to Elaine Mockler of Barclaycard asking whether their ethos wasHabeas or Juris? It is very interesting that Barclaycard have not answered this question throughout all the many years of activity.
Despite being told of court proceedings, Barclaycard continued their onslaught of harassment. On 23. December 2009 a Notice of Formal demand from Debt Managers Ltd of Edinburgh was received with the alleged balance now at £4,840-64, the amount showing on the January 31. threat. On 1. January 2010 Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths replied to Debt Managers with the full story and the constitutional principles lived by. Despite of a 5. January 2010 Urgent Final demand by Debt Managers with threats of court action (not possible as the case was already on the way to court), court costs and an adverse credit rating, Debt Managers on 6. January 2010 on receiving the log of events closed the file and returned the account to Barclaycard. A further agency called Apex Credit in the employ of Barclaycard did likewise on 1. February 2010.
We hereby issue this intimation on the basis that it is clear that Barclaycard have shown themselves capable of properly running this account choosing to harass a claimant whilst waiting a court decision, appearing under different guises at different times and not keeping proper records which MSB Solicitors did prove in line with a House of Lords edict. Barclaycard’s latest incompetence appears with a letter of 31. January 2014 admitting reporting “inaccurate information” that they had not defaulted yet through what seems to be their own agency Mercers they defaulted for a sum of £4,501-64 and now they want to default at £4,840-64!
We believe that a lack of respect to the legal customs of our nation in awaiting a court decision has taken place, and that the original reason for going to court as response to a House of Lords edict which insisted on proper record keeping has well and truly been proven in this case too!
BREACH 4: Use of a “Test Case” that resulted in cases like this one removed from the Courts, that “Test Case” giving reference to foreign laws and customs – illegal under the 1534/59 Act of Supremacy.
We stopped paying Barclaycard at the time leading up to court hearings, hearings that no longer seem to be taking place.
We question the ability of a lower court to wipe out hearings that came about as a result of an edict from the highest court in the land – the House of Lords.
We question the references to the European Court of Justice in the now well know McGuffick case which has clearly been accepted as a test case by Barclaycard, yet in the period before this case Barclaycard continued to harass a claimant – a clear constitutional breach. We believe the case actually proves the case for us – for disputes are legally recognised in the case – thus how can Barclaycard therefore take enforcement action against us when a court has recognised a dispute? We believe this to be Corpus Juris –illegal under British Constitutional Law.
We believe we can prove the illegality of this case as the position given to Protestant Clergymen by H.M. The Queen in her Coronation Oath clearly gives rights and privileges to ensure the Constitutional Acts of 1534, 1689 and 1700 as well as The Elizabethan Settlement is kept to. We do not believe this has occurred with the Mc Guffick Test Case and intend to challenge it even to the Highest Court in the Land – The House of Lords.
We do not believe it to be constitutionally right for a defendant to take enforcement action against a claimant before a hearing or do we believe it right to sell on private information to a third party so as to make money out of the claimant. We have received several phone calls from people we don’t know seemingly knowing our personal financial affairs intimately.
We do believe there have been treasonable actions taking place here, perverting The Course of Justice as well as complete disregard to previous cases that followed the House of Lords Edict, previous cases that include past clients of MSB Solicitors.
There are a number of technical requirements listed relating back to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and we employed MSB Solicitors to check that our now alleged agreements met the demands of this order and the 1974 Consumer Credit Act.
Considerable delay occurred in many cases in the banks returning information and it was clear that once Stage Two was reached that the likelihood of validity was unlikely - such was the wording of the House of Lords Order.
It is clear that the House of Lords Order resulted in a number of legal firms advertising a service that would wipe out debts without affecting credit rating – indeed enhancing them.
On 30 May 2009, however the Daily Mail reported that the Government had stepped in to stop this activity. However, the Lords had issued an Order and that Order is higher than Government Action as the House of Lords is the higher court. We believe our analysis shows reference to the European Court of Justice having influence in all this which we believe to be treasonable under British Constitutional Law. See Breach 5 in which we challenge Barclaycard to come clean as to whether they had talks with the past government to remove these cases.
The McGuffick Case
Phillip McGUFFICK – Claimant and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Defendant before The Honourable Mr Justice Flaux
DISPUTE POINT PROVEN: Consistently Barclaycard had denied there being a dispute– thus giving them apparent legal rights to take enforcement actions against us the Claimant. We also hold proof of an admission of a dispute however by Barclaycard.
Immediately on Page 1 of the McGuffick case – there is a major error in the case. The report introduction relates the case as being one of a large number of cases in relation to disputes that had occurred between banks and debtors. The Court had recognised disputes here – disputes consistently denied in EMLG case by Barclaycard.
Since when in British law has there arisen a situation where one party can default another, affect their ability to trade over a disputed account awaiting a court hearing? We believe this to be global law (Corpus Juris) manifesting in our legal system. Throughout we have paid undisputed accounts – not disputed ones on their way to a hearing. We intend to take this all the way back to the Lords if necessary.
Barclaycard seemed to have defaulted EMLG at the same time as in the McGuffick case that R B of S took enforcement action against McGuffick during the time when they did not have signed papers and the account was “irredeemably unenforceable”:
All law has to be applied with “law and justice in mercy” and so if there is a delay in finding papers then it can be expected that both parties would discuss this together. We believe MSB Solicitors did this in our cases but still considered seven cases irredeemably unenforceable.
Point 9 of the report covers action by the claimant (like ours) of not paying while the account was in dispute. It is noted that R B of S had received hundreds of requests from solicitors and claims management companies on behalf of clients for documents from the bank in relation to legal action.
1689 Act Establishing the Coronation Oath which deals with the application of law in Great Britain: Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to your power cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all your judgements?" King and Queen, "I will." We believe through MSB Solicitors we have offered this to the Banks – but have had enforcement actions against us whilst we were showing mercy.
Point 11 intimates the testimony of Clare Price of R B of S who stated that although it was the policy of the bank to keep all copies of loan agreements – it was not always possible to provide them in the prescribed period.
It is my recollection in our case that MSB informed us that when the prescribed period was over MSB reminded the bank of their obligations and seemingly did not act on the basis of not meeting the time period.
Point 12: It seems R B of S were looking for the agreement when they defaulted the account. Surely the account should have been on hold in this time of dispute instead of going for McGuffick! Point 13: R B of S admitted that they had not issued a signed copy of the agreement during the time period and still defaulted the account! It is admitted that this signed agreement was required by Section 77 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
So why has the case been lost? Point 14: R B of S after considerable delay finds signed agreement which seems to have made the agreement enforceable again under Section 77 (4) but during the time when the account was unenforceable – the Bank defaulted McGuffick. This seems to have been discussed in point 15. Point 17 places doubt by Mr Moran for the claimant that this was not a good test case & in this legal equation there seems to have been in this case a period when the agreement was unenforceable (when the collecting system went against him) and a period when it was enforceable. There was also the added complication of an insurance deal being active in the case which it is not in our cases.
The Point Over whether The Credit Deal and the Implications of the deal were properly set out to McGuffick: Point 18 brings to the fore the actual credit deal itself and whether the costs involved were properly set out, point 19 pointing out that in this case there seems to be an understanding of temporary unenforceability but surely it cannot be legal to act against the claimant with a default during the period of unenforceability. The technicalities of the claimant’s case are put forward in Point 19. There is a note in the transcript that the phrase “irredeemably unenforceable” was used by Lord Hoffman (see the link to the House of Lords) in Dimond v Lovell 2002. What is interesting is that a certain Mr. Flaux (an unusual name) was involved in a 2003 appeal that followed this case. Is this the same person as the judge in this case and what position did he take then? The Appeal case was one between Lagden and O’Connor.
Appeal Case between Lagden & O’Connor in which it would seem The Honourable Mr. Justice Flaux was involved. The Case related to a dispute between motor hire companies and motor insurers, the similarity between this case and ones that relate to credit agreements today is whether the demands of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act have been made. In the 2002 Case the agreement was found to be unenforceable – hence the beginning of the use of this phrase. Point 21: The main issue that had to be resolved in Dimond v Lovell  1 AC 384 was whether the form of agreement which had been used in that case satisfied the requirements of a regulated consumer credit agreement for the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. For reasons that it is not necessary to explain for the purposes of this case where the same difficulty does not arise, the agreement was held to be unenforceable. But one of the points that was argued was whether, even if the claim had been sound, the damages recoverable ought to be limited to the spot hire rate quoted by hirers other than credit hire companies.
In this case a Mr. Flaux took the wider view of the harm placed on the big insurance companies that would have an effect on premiums rather than the individual keeping to the law – this individual decision seemingly being under to the wider view of Mr. Flaux.39. The view of the majority in Dimond v Lovell was based on their analysis of the law, not on consideration of issues of policy. But Mr Flaux sought to invoke policy considerations in this case in order to support his argument that claims handing charges should not be recoverable under any circumstances. He submitted that, if there were to be a relaxation of the rule that claims handling charges were irrecoverable in the case of the cost of car hire, this would increase the burden of insurance premium payments on the whole community. There was also the prospect of claims handling charges being built into damages claims in other fields as well as that relating to car hire. He pointed out how important it was to distinguish between costs and damages in cases brought in the county court in view of the costs limits that are applied to cases under the small claims track. He submitted that, if the claimant were to be allowed to recover the full cost of the Helphire scheme, that would be tantamount to awarding him costs to which he would not otherwise be entitled. To allow the impecunious to recover claims handling charges as part of their claim of damages would encourage accident management companies to market and direct their services at those of limited means with results that would be undesirable.
Utilitarian Position of Mr. Flaux?: A clear view of Mr. Flaux’s perspective on life is shown here, that view clearly to me showing a bias towards the big company and the wider apparent good over the individual keeping of law under the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. This tells me if we are dealing with the same Mr. Flaux here that there is a philosophical bias in the judge based on past statements and actions.
It is my view that in the case McGuffick has become the scapegoat of taking the rap for the greater good in that his keeping of law has to be put aside for the greater good of banks ability to operate – something the Royal Bank of Scotland failed to do – they only being in existence because of taxpayers help.
It is clear after the bail out of the banks that if the thousands of cases had gone through giving the now scapegoats compensation and their now alleged debts written off – it could have bankrupted the banks again – involving a further bail out from the taxpayer thus placing the nation under greater debt.
This is what I believe has happened in this case which is in my view grossly illegal for these activities clearly “pervert the cause of justice.” Is it worth “perverting the cause of justice” for the nation? I believe that this Mc Guffick case shows the answer to be “yes”! “Greater Good” seems to have taken precedence over justice.
This is Utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
This article discusses utilitarian ethical theory. For a discussion of John Stuart Mill's bookUtilitarianism, see Utilitarianism (book). For the architectural theory, see Utilitarianism (architecture)
Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by itsutility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all sentient beings. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome.
Utilitarianism is often described by the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number of people", and is also known as "the greatest happiness principle". Utility, the good to be maximized, has been defined by various thinkers as happiness or pleasure (versus suffering or pain), although preference utilitarians define it as the satisfaction of preferences. It may be described as a life stance, with happiness or pleasure being ofultimate importance.
Utilitarianism can be characterised as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as being a determinant of its moral worth) and virtue ethics (which focuses oncharacter), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism.
In general usage, the term utilitarian (Katrin Joost) refers to a somewhat narrow economic or pragmatic viewpoint. Philosophical utilitarianism, however, is a much broader view that encompasses all aspects of people's lives. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism
Back to the case McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland: in point 20 – the Judge is invited to give guidance in relation to the lender’s refusal to meet the requirements of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. In Point 21 we read Mr Richard Handyside QC urging the court not to embark on such rulings or guidance – this being an inappropriate test case it would seem. There seems to be no disagreement in the case that the Bank had not kept to the terms of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 – yet the Judge founded against the Claimant – we believe because of his utilitarian rather than Constitutional stance.
Similar Activity Against McGuffick as we have had to endure: The activity of the Bank R B of S against McGuffick seem to be similar to the actions against EMLG which relate to contractual obligation to pay, the reporting to credit reference agencies during the time of dispute, claimants personal data being given to a third party which we suspect has happened to EMLG due to the large amount of calls from debt management companies, the demands to pay, the issuing of default notices, the threatening of legal action, the instructing to a third party to demand payment.
We argue – how can any of this be possible during a dispute on its way to court for had EMLG paid during the dispute – she would have been pre-empting the Court’s decision – and breaking the principles of British Constitutional Law?
Other factors in relation to the activities of McGuffick’s solicitors came into the equation too – including the signing of agreements etc., consequences of improper execution, fixed sum credit agreements, ineffective securities, enforcement orders, unfair relationships (we regard it grossly unfair that during the time of dispute – disputes recognised by this court that creditors should take enforcement action before the court has passed judgment).
The Role of Credit Reference Agencies who seemingly have processed adverse information on behalf of defendant banks during times of Dispute leading up to Court Hearings: Under Points 26 to 36 the Court heard of information that is sent to Credit Reference agencies.
We regard the activity highly illegal in times of dispute – for since when has it been part of British law for one side to adversely affect the ability of the other side to trade?
Under British Constitutional law in times of dispute it would be seen customary for both sides to give their side on the record or await a court hearing. A person with a clean criminal record facing a Crown Court hearing would retain his good character until the moment a jury finds him guilty and the Judge has pronounced the verdict – why should EMLG therefore have a credit criminal record before the Court Hearing?
This is an example of Corpus Juris under which legal system a person has to prove his/her innocence which is happening in this case. This is highly treasonable as there is constitutional demand on the Monarch to repress all foreign infiltration into our legal systems.
We therefore issue this Breach on the basis that the use of a “test case” that uses foreign law is not legal constitutionally in Great Britain and that Barclaycard must recognise the seriousness of the House of Lords edict in relation to record keeping, this case clearly proving Barclaycard’s incompetence in this, the scapegoat of this being Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths whose previous excellent credit record and reputation has been destroyed by this causing great distress to her and her family. It is now clear after trying to trade recently that she is being turned away due to her constitutional action on these cases, constitutional action that has disqualified her from trading with her excellent credit record, a fact denied through false reporting to Credit Reference Agencies.
Breach 5: Dialogue with Government to Overturn a House of Lords Edict? It is clear from a Daily Mail article we hold that the UK Government at the time worked to overturn these cases from the courts without giving a fair hearing to each case. We believe we have clear evidence of incorrect record keeping by Barclaycard which was the whole point of the House of Lords edict as this contravenes and still contravenes Section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
This final breach will involve an admission by Barclaycard as to whether they were in discussions with government at the time which seems likely in the overturning of these cases.
Whilst this part of the breach will involve an admission, there is a proven breach here in that it was only from 8. April 2010 that an intimation was given by the High Court in relation to the removal of our case and many others, yet Barclaycard want to issue what is now a second default dated from 27. November 2009, well before the High Court had given their decision, a decision clearly based on Government interference (and likely Bank involvement) to a House of Lords edict designed to assure proper record keeping by banks, in this case our records clearly show accuracy whereas Barclaycard’s do not, hence this notice of CONSTITUTIONAL BREACH.
Issued this day by
Rev Dr David P Griffiths
A Minister of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law
Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths
A Minister of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law
c.c. Prudential Regulation Authority
Financial Conduct Authority
Experian on behalf of the Credit Reference Agencies