The Sinister Case of A

House of Lords Edict being Overturned!

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

 

STOP PRESS -  19 10 15 BARCLAYS ADMITTING CONFIDENTIALITY IN SETTLEMENTS - THIS MINISTRY HAS HAD GOVERNMENT ENQUIRY AFTER GOVERNMENT ENQUIRY COME TOWARDS US - OUR RESPONSE - OPENNESS AND TRANSPARANCY but what about the Banks? - SEE 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/bank-accounts/11927100/Barclays-made-me-sign-a-gag-order-before-it-would-return-2000-of-my-own-money.html

 

 

David P Griffiths  investigates

 

This is quite a saga for those like my wife Lindsay  who took out credit card and loan agreements pre-2007 in UK, agreements we put forward have not been adhered to by banking institutions. We using MSB Solicitors of Liverpool were taking these institutions to court in relation to a House of Lords edict that identified breakages by such institutions of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act thus making in effect the agreements null and void as one side had not kept to the requirements of the agreements.

 

In effect in Christian Terms - one side had broken their side of an agreement by not keeping to laws that surround that agreement which is our presentation of the argument backed up by a House of Lords edict, an edict we put forward was suppressed by a test case that we believe had utilitarian discussions going on in the background that came about as a result of the banking crisis, and European references in the test case - illegal if the nation is keeping to its God given Constitutional Acts.

 

Acts of Parliament which are all signed by the Monarch thus placing them all under our Constitutional Acts are there to protect the people, and in this case the House of Lords was simply doing it's job as the House is in effect is the highest court in the land constitutionally under God.

 

According to the Elizabethan Settlement this God part places ecclesiastical persons in position to ensure our nation is run under the principles clearly outlined in our Constitutional Acts. Within this context I have been firmly led by the Lord to take action here not only against the institutions in question but also against a utilitarian infiltration that has manifest alongside foreign influence to a particular legal case.

 

This is being presented here as our test case to prove the illegality of such influences that are effecting the decisions of our Highest Court in the Land! The repercussions of the actions we are taking here will bring much relief to hard pressed citizens of our nation that have in our view been taken by a banking system that has not adhered to our Constitutional Acts, their motivation coming from the spirit of mammon rather than the God of our Constitution.

 

God is looking for a national repentance and a Commonwealth of Nations that has a banking community working with a helping the people rather than using behind the scenes manipulatioons to suppress our hard won Christian Heritage, a heritage our military over two world wars fought for and gave their lives for.

 

If you are in this position and have taken out pre-2007 credit agreements - please contact us now as we look to bring all such agreements under British Law rather than foreign legal systems that have infiltrated our nation.

We need to understand that Britain has a Constitutional Monarchy oath bound to ensure that our nation does not come under foreign philosphies and ideals which we intend to prove has happenned in this case.

 

The case we refer to relates  to a  Court Hearing conducted by the Honourable Mr Justice Flaux. We believe we can show Utilitarianism as a philosophy being used in relation to British Law as well as unconstitutional references to European Law and the European Court of Justice.

 

Presented by Rev. David P Griffiths of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

 

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

 

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law,andwill you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?" 


King and Queen, "All this I promise to do." 


After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

 

"The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God."


Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

 

Rev David P Griffiths  hereby uses his right as an Ordained Clergy man of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law" to ensure the laws of God are maintained in the nation, to truly profess the true Gospel and the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law."

 

In relation to the Protestant Elizabethan Settlement I will expose all foreign infiltration into our legal processes and look to honour and respect British Law in line with H.M. Queen Elizabeth II oath to maintain the laws of God.

The Study of a "Test Case" that put so many similar cases out of court -

a case illegally using foreign law to overturn an Upper House Edict!

The Case McGuffick and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC

 

David P Griffiths comments IN BLUE

 

The case is outlined here with a summary on each of the 118 points following

 

Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm)Case No: 2009 Folio 910

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL06/10/2009

B e f o r e :

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FLAUX
____________________

Between:PHILLIP McGUFFICKClaimant- and -THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLCDefendant

Note here - who was the Claimant for the claimant is the one to be in effect - found guilty!

____________________

Mr Andrew G. Moran QC and Mr Brendan Burke (instructed by MJP Justice Limited) for the Claimant
Mr Richard Handyside QC and Miss Julia Smith (instructed by DLAPiper UK LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 23rd and 24th September 2009 
____________________

 

This case was heard on 23rd and 24th September 2009 and is described as an "Approved Judgment"!

 

Introduction

 

The introduction contains information on the history of the case that began at Chester County Court as one of a large number of claims before County Courts all over the country. The court document describes these cases as "disputes" whereas in our cases my wife Lindsay and I had experience of our cases being denied as being "a dispute".

 

Point 1 of the judgment refers to the 1974 Consumer Credit act as did the House of Lords ruling previously. The judgment refers to Section 77 of that act which renders agreements unenforceable in certain circumstances.

 

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 77

 

77 Duty to give information to debtor under fixed-sum credit agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

(a)the total sum paid under the agreement by the debtor;

(b)the total sum which has become payable under the agreement by the debtor but remains unpaid, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date when each became due; and

(c)the total sum which is to become payable under the agreement by the debtor, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date, or mode of determining the date, when each becomes due.

 

(2)If the creditor possesses insufficient information to enable him to ascertain the amounts and dates mentioned in subsection (1)(c), he shall be taken to comply with that paragraph if his statement under subsection (1) gives the basis on which, under the regulated agreement, they would fall to be ascertained.

 

(3)Subsection (1) does not apply to—

(a)an agreement under which no sum is, or will or may become, payable by the debtor, or

(b)a request made less than one month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with.

 

(4)If the creditor under an agreement fails to comply with subsection (1)—

(a)he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement; F2. . .

(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 

(5)This section does not apply to a non-commercial agreement.

 

In the cases outlined on this website it was understood by my wife and I through MSB Solicitors of Liverpool  that the banking institutions involved with us could not meet the demands as outlined in Section 77 of the act.

 

This case (McGuffick) had been referred to this Commercial Court by His Honour Judge Halbert as a TEST CASE!

 

What we ask here is be it that this was one of many cases, and be it that a ruling had been given by the House of Lords, how is it that this case was going to be the same as all the other cases, there having been a distinction made in the Lords of two types of cases, namely "discretionary unenforceability" and irredeemably unenforceablity"!

 

Point 2 of the Introduction declared that witness statements from bank employees had been served by the Bank.

 

What we ask here is if this case was to act as a precedent for all the cases due to go through, could the Bank Witness Statements in this case be the same as the Bank Witness Statements in all the other cases?

 

The Essential Facts

 

Points 3 to 18 come under this heading in the judgment.

 

This particular case relates to a "fixed-sum regulated loan agreement" of 3rd. October 2005. The sum borrowed was £17,034, £20,781 to be apparently paid back in 60 monthly instalments of £346-35.

 

The Claimant in this case did not suggest that the agreement was improperly executed so Sections 61, 65 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 was according to the judgment not directly in issue.

 

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 61

 

Signing of agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless—

(a)a document in the prescribed form itself containing all the prescribed terms and conforming to regulations under section 60(1) is signed in the prescribed manner both by the debtor or hirer and by or on behalf of the creditor or owner, and

(b)the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

(c)the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all its terms are readily legible.

 

(2)In addition, where the agreement is one to which section 58(1) applies, it is not properly executed unless—

(a)the requirements of section 58(1) were complied with, and

(b)the unexecuted agreement was sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer [F1by an appropriate method] not less than seven days after a copy of it was given to him under section 58(1), and

(c)during the consideration period, the creditor or owner refrained from approaching the debtor or hirer (whether in person, by telephone or letter, or in any other way) except in response to a specific request made by the debtor or hirer after the beginning of the consideration period, and

(d)no notice of withdrawal by the debtor or hirer was received by the creditor or owner before the sending of the unexecuted agreement.

 

(3)In subsection (2)(c), “the consideration period ” means the period beginning with the giving of the copy under section 58(1) and ending—

(a)at the expiry of seven days after the day on which the unexecuted agreement is sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer, or

(b)on its return by the debtor or hirer after signature by him,

whichever first occurs.

 

(4)Where the debtor or hirer is a partnership or an unincorporated body of persons, subsection (1)(a) shall apply with the substitution for “by the debtor or hirer ” of “by or on behalf of the debtor or hirer ”.

 

There is an obligation here for the Bank to prove this is in order but be it that there was many more cases than this one, cases where it would seem the banking institutions were unable to provide such proof - then how could this be a test case putting all the others it would seem out of court?

 

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 65

 

Consequences of improper execution. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)An improperly-executed regulated agreement is enforceable against the debtor or hirer on an order of the court only.

(2)A retaking of goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates is an enforcement of the agreement.

 

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 127

 

Enforcement orders in cases of infringement.

 

E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)In the case of an application for an enforcement order under—

 

(a)section 65(1) (improperly executed agreements), or

 

(b)section 105(7)(a) or (b) (improperly executed security instruments), or

 

(c) section 111(2) (failure to serve copy of notice on surety), or

 

(d) section 124(1) or (2) (taking of negotiable instrument in contravention of section 123),

 

the court shall dismiss the application if, but F1. . . only if, it considers it just to do so having regard to—

 

(i) prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question, and the degree of culpability for it; and

 

(ii) the powers conferred on the court by subsection (2) and sections 135 and 136.

 

(2) If it appears to the court just to do so, it may in an enforcement order reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or hirer, or any surety, so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention in question.

 

There is clearly here provision for cases were documentation has not been provided by the banking institution and even so if this case the bank has provided, again we ask, is this the case in all the other cases?

 

Point 4 relates to the specific monetary sums involved in this case, point 5 relating to a default notice that had been issued by the Bank as indeed does point 6 that refers to Credit Reference Agencies Callcredit plc; Equifax Europe Limited and Experian Limited, this default reference not only affecting the ability to get credit by the individual involved but also other members of the household in question for a period of up to six years.

 

We strongly question the legality of this, in this case and in all other cases. We in Britain have traditionally enjoyed living under the principles of Habeas Corpus which means that one is innocent before being found guilty in court. In the European system of Corpus Juris then it is up to the individual to prove his innocence.

 

This is not the case in Britain so here we have the Royal Bank of scotland issuing a default notice on Mr McGuffick whilst the case is on its way to court and giving him a "criminal" record (in other words finding him guilty before a court case) by issuing notice to Credit Reference Agencies before his hearing, not only on him but members of his household too.

 

If this principle therefore operated in criminal law, when the Police arrested a man they could put the guilt of the man on record before going to court. In addition members of his household would be guilty too.

 

We regard this practice as an extreme example of the use of Corpus Juris, a system totally outlawed under British law and this way of operation should be resulting in an outrage amongst the British people whose whole tradition of law is being set upon by philosophies that have no place under our Constitution.

 

Even though Point 7 shows the Bank not adding interest during all of this, it does show that the Bank has already found him guilty thus pre-empting the Court decision of the Honourable Justice Flaux.

 

EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POINT WHEN IT COMES TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW!

 

Point 8 refers to two agencies that attempted to receive funds from Mr McGuffick, that is Apex Credit Management and Capquest  Debt Recovery Limited.

 

Point 9 refers to a letter dated 25th February 2009 from MJP Solictors for the claimant to Royal Bank of scotland with a Section 77 Information Request.

 

The letter stated that the claimant considered the account to be in dispute and that no reference was to be given to Credit Reference agencies which is exactly our point. Mr Guffick had given his solicitors opportunity to ascertain from the papers the Bank were to send whether the agreement was enforceable under sections 61 and 127 of the act.

 

It is noted under Point 9 that the Bank had received hundreds of similar requests from solicitors and claims management companies.

 

Point 10 outlines Section 77 as shown on this web page.

 

Point 11 gives an admission from the Royal Bank of Scotland's Clare Price that although it was the practice of the Bank to keep all copies of credit agreements, it sometimes was not possible to comply with requests under Section 77 within the prescribed period.

 

Here it would seem that the Royal Bank of Scotland have admitted that sometimes they could not keep to the terms of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act within the prescribed period, but what they could do is default a customer whilst legal processes were going on.

 

WE PASSIONATELY DECLARE THIS ILLEGAL AS WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO DO AS PROTESTANT REFORMED MINISTERS THE MONARCH HAS AGREED TO TAKE NOTE OF - THE JUDGE BEING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MONARCH. OUR POINT HAS TO BE LISTENED TO BY LAW AND ABIDED BY!

 

Point 12 informs us that the Bank initially could not find a copy of the agreement and wrote to MJP to inform them of this.

 

It seems from Point 12 that there is a further incredible admission, the Bank stating to the claimant: in the circumstances, if the claimant decided not to meet his obligations under the agreement, the bank would not be able to enforce repayment of the loan.

 

Point 13 relates to correspondence by MJP threatening proceedings for a declaration of unenforceability by the court if the copy of the agreement was not produced within 28 days and for an injunction if the claimant's credit rating were affected.

 

Section 77 does have a time period stated, and even though by May 11 2009 the Bank had located a copy of the agreement, through inadvertence a signed statement of account as required by Section 77 had been overlooked.

 

There comes a question here that as the Bank could not provide a copy of the agreement in the prescribed period, this being admitted by the Bank, the same Bank on not being able to view a copy of the agreement defaulted an account blackening not only the name of Mr McGuffick but also his household.

 

How can that be under British law or are we to find European Global law coming into the equation?

 

Point 14 shows that collection activity was again activated by the Bank on 13 May 2009 but on the Bank realising that the claimant had issued proceedings ceased the activity. This remained the case up till the hearing although Capquest had got involved by mistake, the Bank at this stage holding fire to enable the Court to decide.

 

It is clear however that the Bank had already pre-empted the hearing by defaulting before the hearing, putting disputed information to collection agencies before the hearing not only reducing the ability of Mr McGuffick to trade but also the ability of his household to trade also!

 

This we present as a Corpus Juris style stranglehold on McGuffick in that the Bank had blacklisted him before the hearing, the backing off by the Bank on knowing the hearing was near is to us proof that the Bank was aware of the dangers of pre-empting a court decision.

 

The Relief Sought

 

Point 15 related to the relief sought by the claimant. It would seem from the evidence that the Royal Bank of Scotland had placed adverse information against McGuffick to Credit Reference Agencies in the process of the case being brought to this hearing. McGuffick was looking to obtain an injunction against the Bank doing what seemingly it had already done!

 

Indeed part 2 of Point 15 gives an alternative to the Court that if the Bank was entitled to continue reporting to CRA's and indeed it would seem they were still reporting even whilst accepting they had been in breach of Section 77 of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act - then the Court was being asked to make a statement of there being no enforceable liability.

 

We say - what a ludicrous situation! The Bank it would seem had accepted their breach of Section 77 yet was reporting against McGuffick whilst accepting their breach. It seems to us that it should have been Royal Bank of Scotland appearing on the Credit Reference Agency's record for being in breach of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act and that McGuffick was innocent!

 

But oh no! The Big Boy was the one with the access and be able to give an equivalent to a criminal record to McGuffick even though the case had not been heard in court yet and even no the Bank had admitted its breach.

 

Well if this website is going to stick up for Habeas Corpus its now by saying that in our view this case has no link whatsoever with both the principles and actual law of our Constitutional Acts, and in addition that even when there is an admission of guilt which there seems to be by the Royal of Scotland - it is the victim of the breach that gets the equivalent of the criminal record.

 

We are blowing the trumpets in Zion, we are sounding the alarm in God's Holy Mountain with our deep conviction that this is not only illegal, not only immoral but also a breach of what our nation has held precious for centuries.

 

Joel 2:1 (King James Version)


Blow ye the trumpet in Zion, and sound an alarm in my holy mountain: let all the inhabitants of the land tremble: for the day of the LORD cometh, for it is nigh at hand;

 

Part 3 looked for a mandatory injunction for the Bank to inform the Credit Reference Agencies that McGuffick had not been in default after all and that from 11 March 2009 onwards the claimant's "default" was in a time of the Bank's breach of Section 77, the latter part 4 asking for a mandatory injunction ordering the bank to provide the claimant with a signed statement of account by Section 77(1).

The Parameters of the Case

 

Points 16 & 17 gives the way the case was to be conducted under certain parameters, the claimant's QC speaking for the claimant instead of emphasizing the very real constitutional points outlined in our commentary declared the case as not being as appropriate a test case as others might have been.

 

To us the "test case" had more than adequately shown the finding of guilt before a case, even when the Bank had seemingly admitted a breach.

 

The reason for the QC's comments however is outlined in that it would seem that the Claimant had admitted a time of validity which clearly in other cases this is not the case.

 

If this is the case there is clearly a major difference here, but why then should this case impact others cases to be taken out the system if there are major differences?

 

Point 17 does give further particular peculiarities to this case which certainly would not apply to many other cases.

 

Point 18 relates to the case being left open as to whether the agreement had properly set out the total charge for credit under Section 61(1)(a) and the regulations made under section 60(1)(b) of the 1974 Act, there being an apparent agreement with parties here that when the Bank had issued the agreement, then the agreement would come enforceable again.

 

Just because there seems to be an acceptance of this in this case, this does not mean that there would be similar agreements in every case!

 

The parameters in Point 19 further show the case to be one of temorary or redeemable unenforceability concerned only with Section 77 of the act.

 

This in our view is not good enough. Parameters are being put into place in this case which would  in our view be antagonistic against the claimant. It is extremely serious to only cover one avenue of the Bank's behaviour. It is important as we do here to cover the behaviour of the Bank before the case and their action in effect finding McGuffick guilty by "criminalising him" before a hearing. It is our our view that this parameter brought about a false context to the case.

 

Mr MoranQC in Point 20 seems to be very generous to the defendant in Point 20 by asking the Judge to give guidance.

 

We have an admitted breach here and during the time of the breach Royal Bank of Scotland seemingly "criminalised" the claimant.

 

Mr Richard Handyside QC for the defendant seems to have taken this up not only to benefit his own client, the Royal Bank of Scotland but for all the banking institutions involved in these cases, that even though the case was a "test case," it would seem only the specifics to this case could be considered by the court because the wider issues which seem to be described here as "hyporhetical facts" as they relate to other cases not before the court could not be considered.

 

This is fair enough in our view as long as it is not a "test case". It is a "test case" however and of courses there are differences in this case to other cases. Of course a court could not decide on other cases so why has this case be part of a process pulling out all the other cases.

 

We see this as unconstitutional and illegal.

 

The Issues

 

Point 22 relates to Mr Handyside's list of issues with a skeleton argument not formally agreed that is nonetheless described as "a useful summary" even though to an extent the list had been overtaken by events!

 

Oh dear!

 

Point 23 is a summary of issues awaiting decision.

 

(1)  This relates to £15,066-21 with a statement in the point that the figure had been outstanding under the agreement since June 2007.

 

Has the Court stopped using the word "alleged". The decision of the Court has not been given yet. We are awaiting the decision of the Judge yet in the transcript we read of an amount outstanding under the agreement.

 

As it would seem that this is just coming towards the Court, then surely we are dealing with an "alleged" sum outstanding, the agreement and its validity being brought under question because under the 1974 Consumer Credit Act an agreement to be an agreement has to be under certain criteria in law. It has not been decided yet whether this is an agreement in law or not.

 

Where was Mr Moran QC with his "Objection - Your Honour!"

 

(2)  Part 2 gives a statement of a period of non-compliance.

 

It would seem from the case that there is a period of accepted "breach", the parameters set out however not allowing there to be consideration of reporting to CRA's during that period!

 

However, the behaviour of the Bank is lists in the area of the Bank's reporting to CRA's; the enforcement action of the Bank with defaulting, the threatening of legal action and the Bank's instruction to a third party.

 

(3)  This relates as to whether the Claimant has any right to be protected by an injunction.

 

(4)  This relates as to whether theCourt can grant an injunction to force the Bank to serve the signed statement of account as requited by Section 77(1)  of the 1974 Act.

 

(5)  This relates as to whether the Bank can continue reporting to CRA's.

 

(6) This relates to Unfair Trading Regulations.

 

(7)  A reference to a letter from MJP Solicitors of 10 June 2009 as to whether it was a valid notice under section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998.

 

(8)  This relates to the Banks and CRA's carrying information as passed on by the Bank in these circumstances.

 

(9)  A very important point here relates to the failure of the Bank to inform the CRA of the full facts, unfair to the claimant within the meaning of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act.

 

140AUnfair relationships between creditors and debtorsE+W+S+N.I.

(1)The court may make an order under section 140B in connection with a credit agreement if it determines that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement (or the agreement taken with any related agreement) is unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following—

(a)any of the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

(b)the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement;

(c)any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement).

(2)In deciding whether to make a determination under this section the court shall have regard to all matters it thinks relevant (including matters relating to the creditor and matters relating to the debtor).

(3)For the purposes of this section the court shall (except to the extent that it is not appropriate to do so) treat anything done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, an associate or a former associate of the creditor as if done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, the creditor.

(4)A determination may be made under this section in relation to a relationship notwithstanding that the relationship may have ended.

(5)An order under section 140B shall not be made in connection with a credit agreement which is an exempt agreement by virtue of section 16(6C).]

 

It is our view that in a dispute both sides should have opportunity to give their view to an outside agency like a CRA.

 

Point 24 relates to the following points (in part 3) relating to provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 as oulined by the McGuffick case.

The Provisions of the Consumer Credit Acts

(as outlined in the Mc Guffick Case)

 

Point 25 of the case outline the provisions of the act that fall for consideration in this case.

 

Form and Content of Agreements

 

60 Form and content of agreements.E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)The Secretary of State shall make regulations as to the form and content of documents embodying regulated agreements, and the regulations shall contain such provisions as appear to him appropriate with a view to ensuring that the debtor or hirer is made aware of—

 

(a)the rights and duties conferred or imposed on him by the agreement,

 

(b)the amount and rate of the total charge for credit (in the case of a consumer credit agreement),

 

(c)the protection and remedies available to him under this Act, and

 

(d)any other matters which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, it is desirable for him to know about in connection with the agreement.

 

What is interesting in this case is that only Part 1 of Section 60 has been brought towards the Court for consideration.

 

We bring the rest of section 60 for our consideration as a "Protestant Reformed" Ministry established by law in our Constitution.

 

(2)Regulations under subsection (1) may in particular—

 

(a)require specified information to be included in the prescribed manner in documents, and other specified material to be excluded;

 

(b)contain requirements to ensure that specified information is clearly brought to the attention of the debtor or hirer, and that one part of a document is not given insufficient or excessive prominence compared with another.

 

This is very important to the case as it would seem Royal Bank of Scotland were unable to do this, specified information it would seem by the Royal Bank's own admission they were unable to supply.

 

(3)If, on an application made to the [F1] by a person carrying on a consumer credit business or a consumer hire business, it appears to the [F1OFT] impracticable for the applicant to comply with any requirement of regulations under subsection (1) in a particular case, [F2it] may, by notice to the applicant direct that the requirement be waived or varied in relation to such agreements, and subject to such conditions (if any), as [F2it] may specify, and this Act and the regulations shall have effect accordingly.

 

The Office of Fair Trading clearly has a role to see fair play.

 

(4)The [F1OFT] shall give a notice under subsection (3) only if [F2it] is satisfied that to do so would not prejudice the interests of debtors or hirers.

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 60(3)(4) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278, 279, Sch. 25 para. 6(23); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)F2Words in s. 60(3)(4) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278,279, Sch. 25 para. 6(23); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)

 

Signing of Agreement

 

61 Signing of agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless—

 

(a)a document in the prescribed form itself containing all the prescribed terms and conforming to regulations under section 60(1) is signed in the prescribed manner both by the debtor or hirer and by or on behalf of the creditor or owner, and

 

(b)the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

 

(c)the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all its terms are readily legible.

 

How could McGuffick's solicitors give opinion on the documentation if the Royal Bank of Scotland did not provide the information in the prescribed time?

 

Again - only Part 1 of Section 61 was presented in the transcript possibly understandably here due to the context of Section 58. We nevertheless present the rest of the section to put the section in context:

 

(2)In addition, where the agreement is one to which section 58(1) applies, it is not properly executed unless—

 

(a)the requirements of section 58(1) were complied with, and

 

(b)the unexecuted agreement was sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer [F1by an appropriate method] not less than seven days after a copy of it was given to him under section 58(1), and

 

(c)during the consideration period, the creditor or owner refrained from approaching the debtor or hirer (whether in person, by telephone or letter, or in any other way) except in response to a specific request made by the debtor or hirer after the beginning of the consideration period, and

 

(d)no notice of withdrawal by the debtor or hirer was received by the creditor or owner before the sending of the unexecuted agreement.

 

(3)In subsection (2)(c), “the consideration period ” means the period beginning with the giving of the copy under section 58(1) and ending—

 

(a)at the expiry of seven days after the day on which the unexecuted agreement is sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer, or

 

(b)on its return by the debtor or hirer after signature by him,

whichever first occurs.

 

(4)Where the debtor or hirer is a partnership or an unincorporated body of persons, subsection (1)(a) shall apply with the substitution for “by the debtor or hirer ” of “by or on behalf of the debtor or hirer ”.

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 61(2)(b) substituted (31.12.2004) by The Consumer Credit Act 1974 (Electronic Communications) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/3236), art. 2(2)

 

Section 58(1) is cited in the section which relates to land mortgage rather than the unsecured situation we have with McGuffick.

 

Consequences of Improper Execution

 

Consequences of improper execution. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)An improperly-executed regulated agreement is enforceable against the debtor or hirer on an order of the court only.

 

(2)A retaking of goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates is an enforcement of the agreement.

 

The Court however to be a Court has to be operating under the fact that the Crest of H.M. The Queen representing all her oaths and the context that foreign law has to be suppressed is in place.

 

We believe that we can show this has not been the case with the McGuffick hearing.

 

Statements to be Provided in relation to Fixed-Sum Credit Agreements

 

F177AStatements to be provided in relation to fixed-sum credit agreementsE+W+S+N.I.

 

[F2(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit must give the debtor statements under this section.

 

(1A)The statements must relate to consecutive periods.

 

(1B)The first such period must begin with either—

(a)the day on which the agreement is made, or

(b)the day the first movement occurs on the debtor's account with the creditor relating to the agreement.

 

(1C)No such period may exceed a year.

 

(1D)For the purposes of subsection (1C), a period of a year which expires on a non-working day may be regarded as expiring on the next working day.

 

(1E)Each statement under this section must be given to the debtor before the end of the period of thirty days beginning with the day after the end of the period to which the statement relates.]

 

(2)Regulations may make provision about the form and content of statements under this section.

 

(3)The debtor shall have no liability to pay any sum in connection with the preparation or the giving to him of a statement under this section.

 

(4)The creditor is not required to give the debtor any statement under this section once the following conditions are satisfied—

 

(a)that there is no sum payable under the agreement by the debtor; and

 

(b)that there is no sum which will or may become so payable.

 

(5)Subsection (6) applies if at a time before the conditions mentioned in subsection (4) are satisfied the creditor fails to give the debtor—

 

(a)a statement under this section within the period mentioned in subsection [F3(1E)] ; [F1or]

(b)

[F1such a statement within the period of one year beginning with the day after the day on which such a statement was last given to him.]

 

(6)Where this subsection applies in relation to a failure to give a statement under this section to the debtor—

 

(a)the creditor shall not be entitled to enforce the agreement during the period of non-compliance;

(b)the debtor shall have no liability to pay any sum of interest to the extent calculated by reference to the period of non-compliance or to any part of it; and

 

(c)the debtor shall have no liability to pay any default sum which (apart from this paragraph)—

 

(i)would have become payable during the period of non-compliance; or

 

(ii)would have become payable after the end of that period in connection with a breach of the agreement which occurs during that period (whether or not the breach continues after the end of that period).

 

(7)In this section ‘the period of non-compliance’ means, in relation to a failure to give a statement under this section to the debtor, the period which—

 

(a)begins immediately after the end of the period mentioned in F4. . . subsection (5); and

 

(b)ends at the end of the day on which the statement is given to the debtor or on which the conditions mentioned in subsection (4) are satisfied, whichever is earlier.

 

(8)This section does not apply in relation to a non-commercial agreement or to a small agreement.]

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.

Amendments (Textual)F2S. 77A(1)-(1E) substituted for s. 77A(1) (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(a) (with art. 5)F3Words in s. 77A(5) substituted (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(b)(i) (with art. 5)F1S. 77A(5)(b) and preceding word ceased to have effect (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(b)(ii) (with art. 5)F4Words in s. 77A(7)omitted (31.10.2008) by virtue of The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(c) (with art. 5)F1S. 77A inserted (16.6.2006 for certain purposes and otherwise 1.10.2008) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {6}, 71(2) (with Sch. 3 para. 2); S.I. 2006/1508, art. 3(1), Sch. 1; S.I. 2007/3300, art. 3(3), Sch. 3Modifications etc. (not altering text)C1S. 77A modified (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826) {art. 5}

 

The Act here shows the administrative demands in relation to agreements. Interesting that only Section 77A was brought to the attention of the Court in this hearing. Surely main section 77 should have been considered to place Section 77a into context.

 

77 Duty to give information to debtor under fixed-sum credit agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

 

Section 77 is crucial in this case because

 

It would seem from this case that it was accepted by Royal Bank of Scotland that they were unable to give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement within the prescribed period yet whilst accepting the inability seemingly ran enforcement action again McGuffick!

 

(a)the total sum paid under the agreement by the debtor;

 

(b)the total sum which has become payable under the agreement by the debtor but remains unpaid, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date when each became due; and

 

(c)the total sum which is to become payable under the agreement by the debtor, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date, or mode of determining the date, when each becomes due.

 

(2)If the creditor possesses insufficient information to enable him to ascertain the amounts and dates mentioned in subsection (1)(c), he shall be taken to comply with that paragraph if his statement under subsection (1) gives the basis on which, under the regulated agreement, they would fall to be ascertained.

 

(3)Subsection (1) does not apply to—

 

(a)an agreement under which no sum is, or will or may become, payable by the debtor, or

 

(b)a request made less than one month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with.

 

(4)If the creditor under an agreement fails to comply with subsection (1)—

 

(a)he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement; F2. . .

 

(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 

Interesting how in this case it would seem Section 77 is not presented here for it seems to be clear Royal Bank of Scotland could not produce the required documents in the prescribed period yet even without the documents seems to have black-listed McGuffick with the Credit Reference Agencies thus reducing he and his household to trade!

 

Can we be sure that the late documents are genuine - but whether they are or not - the prescribed period seems to have lapsed!

 

(5)This section does not apply to a non-commercial agreement.

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.


Amendments (Textual)F1"£1" substituted (1.5.1998) in s. 77(1) by S.I. 1998/997, art. 3,Sch.F2S. 77(4)(b) and preceding word repealed (26.5.2008) by The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/1277) regs. 30(1)(3), Sch. 2 para. 19, {Sch. 4 Pt. 1} (with savings in reg. 28(2)(3))

Ineffective Securities

 

106 Ineffective securities.E+W+S+N.I.

 

Where, under any provision of this Act, this section is applied to any security provided in relation to a regulated agreement, then, subject to section 177 (saving for registered charges)—

 

(a)the security, so far as it is so provided, shall be treated as never having effect;

 

(b)any property lodged with the creditor or owner solely for the purposes of the security as so provided shall be returned by him forthwith;

 

(c)the creditor or owner shall take any necessary action to remove or cancel an entry in any register, so far as the entry relates to the security as so provided; and

 

(d)any amount received by the creditor or owner on realisation of the security shall, so far as it is referable to the agreement, be repaid to the surety.

 

Act Not to be Evaded by Use of Security

 

113 Act not to be evaded by use of security.E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)Where a security is provided in relation to an actual or prospective regulated agreement, the security shall not be enforced so as to benefit the creditor or owner, directly or indirectly, to an extent greater (whether as respects the amount of any payment or the time or manner of its being made) than would be the case if the security were not provided and any obligations of the debtor or hirer, or his relative, under or in relation to the agreement were carried out to the extent (if any) to which they would be enforced under this Act.

 

(2)In accordance with subsection (1), where a regulated agreement is enforceable on an order of the court or the [F1] only, any security provided in relation to the agreement is enforceable (so far as provided in relation to the agreement) where such an order has been made in relation to the agreement, but not otherwise.

 

(3)Where—

 

(a)a regulated agreement is cancelled under section 69(1) or becomes subject to section 69(2), or

 

(b)a regulated agreement is terminated under section 91, or

 

(c)in relation to any agreement an application for an order under section 40(2), 65(1), 124(1) or 149(2) is dismissed (except on technical grounds only), or

 

(d)a declaration is made by the court under section 142(1) (refusal of enforcement order) as respects any regulated agreement,

section 106 shall apply to any security provided in relation to the agreement.

 

The following part of Section 113 was not placed

before the Court for consideration

 

(4)Where subsection (3)(d) applies and the declaration relates to a part only of the regulated agreement, section 106 shall apply to the security only so far as it concerns that part.

 

(5)In the case of a cancelled agreement, the duty imposed on the debtor or hirer by section 71 or 72 shall not be enforceable before the creditor or owner has discharged any duty imposed on him by section 106 (as applied by subsection (3)(a)).

 

(6)If the security is provided in relation to a prospective agreement or transaction, the security shall be enforceable in relation to the agreement or transaction only after the time (if any) when the agreement is made; and until that time the person providing the security shall be entitled, by notice to the creditor or owner, to require that section 106 shall thereupon apply to the security.

 

(7)Where an indemnity [F2or guarantee] is given in a case where the debtor or hirer is a minor, or [F3an indemnity is given in a case where he] is otherwise not of full capacity, the reference in subsection (1) to the extent to which his obligations would be enforced shall be read in relation to the indemnity [F2or guarantee] as a reference to the extent to which [F4they][F4those obligations] would be enforced if he were of full capacity.

 

(8)Subsections (1) to (3) also apply where a security is provided in relation to an actual or prospective linked transaction, and in that case—

 

(a)references to the agreement shall be read as references to the linked transaction, and

 

(b)references to the creditor or owner shall be read as references to any person (other than the debtor or hirer, or his relative) who is a party, or prospective party, to the linked transaction.

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 113(2) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278, 279, Sch. 25 para. 6(27); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)F2Words inserted (E.W.N.I.) by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(a) and (N.I.) S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(a)F3Words inserted (E.W.N.I.) by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(b) and (N.I.) S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(b)F4Words “those obligations ” substituted (E.W.N.I.) for “they ” by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(c) and (N.I.)S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(c)

 

Enforcement Orders in Case of Infringement

 

We have given the full section here whereas the Court was only presented with part (1) (a) and Part 3 which seems to have been repealed by the Consumer Credit Act of 2006 which seems to have come into law on 6th April 2007.

 

Part 3 read as follows:

 

The court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65 (1) if section 61 (1) (a) (signing of agreements) was not complied with ...

 

It would seem from the evidence that this was a pre 06 April 2007 case.

 

127 Enforcement orders in cases of infringement. E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)In the case of an application for an enforcement order under—

 

(a)section 65(1) (improperly executed agreements), or

 

(b)section 105(7)(a) or (b) (improperly executed security instruments), or

 

(c)section 111(2) (failure to serve copy of notice on surety), or

 

(d)section 124(1) or (2) (taking of negotiable instrument in contravention of section 123),

the court shall dismiss the application if, but F1. . . only if, it considers it just to do so having regard to—

 

(i)prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question, and the degree of culpability for it; and

 

(ii)the powers conferred on the court by subsection (2) and sections 135 and 136.

 

(2)If it appears to the court just to do so, it may in an enforcement order reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or hirer, or any surety, so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention in question.

 

(3)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 

(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 

(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.
Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 127(1) repealed (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. 70, 71(2), Sch. 4 (with Sch. 3 para. 11); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2F2S. 127(3)-(5) repealed (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {15}, 70, 71(2), {Sch. 4} (with Sch. 3 para. 11); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2

 

Unfair Relationships Between Creditors and Debtors

 

[140AUnfair relationships between creditors and debtorsE+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)The court may make an order under section 140B in connection with a credit agreement if it determines that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement (or the agreement taken with any related agreement) is unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following—

 

(a)any of the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

 

(b)the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement;

 

(c)any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement).

 

The following was not presented to the Court, and we would argue that point 4 here could well be relevant because how can there be a relationship when one side takes penal action without the relevant documentation against the other.

 

(2)In deciding whether to make a determination under this section the court shall have regard to all matters it thinks relevant (including matters relating to the creditor and matters relating to the debtor).

 

(3)For the purposes of this section the court shall (except to the extent that it is not appropriate to do so) treat anything done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, an associate or a former associate of the creditor as if done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, the creditor.

 

(4)A determination may be made under this section in relation to a relationship notwithstanding that the relationship may have ended.

 

(5)An order under section 140B shall not be made in connection with a credit agreement which is an exempt agreement by virtue of section 16(6C).]

 

Powers of Court in Relation to Unfair Relationships

 

140BPowers of court in relation to unfair relationshipsE+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)An order under this section in connection with a credit agreement may do one or more of the following—

 

(a)require the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, to repay (in whole or in part) any sum paid by the debtor or by a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement (whether paid to the creditor, the associate or the former associate or to any other person);

 

(b)require the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, to do or not to do (or to cease doing) anything specified in the order in connection with the agreement or any related agreement;

 

(c)reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or by a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement;

 

(d)direct the return to a surety of any property provided by him for the purposes of a security;

 

(e)otherwise set aside (in whole or in part) any duty imposed on the debtor or on a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement;

 

(f)alter the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

 

(g)direct accounts to be taken, or (in Scotland) an accounting to be made, between any persons.

 

It is important to realise the extent of debt over the last twenty years in our society, the weighting of many agreements being twards the banking institutions who have in our view followed mammon rather than be servants of the people - as the old time Bank Manager was to a community.

 

However what is really interesting here is the part of 140 B not presented to the Court:

 

(2)An order under this section may be made in connection with a credit agreement only—

 

(a)on an application made by the debtor or by a surety;

 

Remembering this was an apparent "test case", this section not being presented in this McGuffick case, but surely by this case removing many cases from the system prevents who is described as "the debtor" making an application under law that is not even being presented in this case!

 

(b)at the instance of the debtor or a surety in any proceedings in any court to which the debtor and the creditor are parties, being proceedings to enforce the agreement or any related agreement; or

 

(c)at the instance of the debtor or a surety in any other proceedings in any court where the amount paid or payable under the agreement or any related agreement is relevant.

 

(3)An order under this section may be made notwithstanding that its effect is to place on the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, a burden in respect of an advantage enjoyed by another person.

 

(4)An application under subsection (2)(a) may only be made—

 

(a)in England and Wales, to the county court;

 

(b)in Scotland, to the sheriff court;

 

(c)in Northern Ireland, to the High Court (subject to subsection (6)).

 

(5)In Scotland such an application may be made in the sheriff court for the district in which the debtor or surety resides or carries on business.

 

(6)In Northern Ireland such an application may be made to the county court if the credit agreement is an agreement under which the creditor provides the debtor with—

 

(a)fixed-sum credit not exceeding £15,000; or

 

(b)running-account credit on which the credit limit does not exceed £15,000.

 

(7)Without prejudice to any provision which may be made by rules of court made in relation to county courts in Northern Ireland, such rules may provide that an application made by virtue of subsection (6) may be made in the county court for the division in which the debtor or surety resides or carries on business.

 

(8)A party to any proceedings mentioned in subsection (2) shall be entitled, in accordance with rules of court, to have any person who might be the subject of an order under this section made a party to the proceedings.

 

(9)If, in any such proceedings, the debtor or a surety alleges that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor is unfair to the debtor, it is for the creditor to prove to the contrary.]]

 

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.

Amendments (Textual)F2S. 140B inserted (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {20}, 71(2) (with Sch. 3 paras. 14, 16); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2

 

Power to Declare Rights of Parties

 

142 Power to declare rights of parties.E+W+S+N.I.

 

(1)Where under any provision of this Act a thing can be done by a creditor or owner on an enforcement order only, and either—

 

(a)the court dismisses (except on technical grounds only) an application for an enforcement order, or

 

(b)where no such application has been made or such an application has been dismissed on technical grounds only, an interested party applies to the court for a declaration under this subsection,

 

the court may if it thinks just make a declaration that the creditor or owner is not entitled to do that thing, and thereafter no application for an enforcement order in respect of it shall be entertained.

 

The following not presented to the Court

 

(2)Where—

 

(a)a regulated agreement or linked transaction is cancelled under section 69(1), or becomes subject to section 69(2), or

 

(b)a regulated agreement is terminated under section 91,

and an interested party applies to the court for a declaration under this subsection, the court may make a declaration to that effect.

 

We have seen from this presentation the part of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act presented to the Court, there being however great relevance in parts of the 1974 Act that were not presented.

 

The Claimant most certainly seemed to have the law on his side with the apparent admission of Royal Bank of Scotland that they had not produced documentation within the prescribed period, this section seemingly missing from Court condideration at this stage:

 

(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

 

Section 77 is crucial in this case because

 

It would seem from this case that it was accepted by Royal Bank of Scotland that they were unable to give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement within the prescribed period yet whilst accepting the inability seemingly ran enforcement action again McGuffick!

 

Our belief from the hearing is that it is clear that Royal Bank of Scotland could not keep to the requirements of the Act which is just one breach! There is a far worse one in our view and that is in their own enforcement action against McGuffick whilst not holding the necessary documentation to back it!

The McGuffick Case: Notification to Credit Reference Agencies

 

Point 26 intimates that the Bank provides information to three CRA's in U.K.: Callcredit PLC, Equifax Europe Ltd and Experian Limited. These are all licensed by the Office of Fair Trading defined by Section 145(8) of the 1974 Act.

 

145 (8)A credit reference agency is a person carrying on a business comprising the furnishing of persons with information relevant to the financial standing of individuals, being information collected by the agency for that purpose.

 

Point 27 identifies the actual mechanics of all of this. An important principle of the operation of this called "The Governing Principle" is outlined.

 

Data are shared only for the prevention of over-commitment, bad debt, fraud, and money laundering, and to support debt recovery and debtor tracing, with the aim of promoting responsible lending.

 

Mr Moran speaking for the Claimant seems to question therefore the use of CRA's as being a tool for enforcement. In other words the Bank could threaten (before a hearing in this case) that if you do not do what we say the default would be reported to the CRA.

 

This is what we are boldly declaring as completely and absolutely unconstitutional. The Bank it would seem in this case was threatening this before the matter had reached court and seemingly before they had provided the documentation. Absolutely UNFAIR WE SAY and what we see as the operations of Corpus Juris - GUILTY WITH A RECORD BEFORE A HEARING.

 

If the principle of a man being innocent before a hearing was being applied(Habeas Corpus) then no reference would have been made to the CRA!

 

Point 28 gives Mr Moran really emphasizing this point of CRA recording.

 

Point 29 shows the adeverse consequences for the debtor and his "associates" - other members of his household as shown in the letter from the Bank of 15th. May 2007 - in the form of adverse credit showing for a period of six years. This can impair employment prospects in certain Government Departments or the Police who can access credit data on a person for the purposes of employment vetting.

 

In the cases we are outlining on this site that even though we were in dispute with Banks - they could play the big hand and reduces our employment and trading opportunities for a period of six years unless we did what they said before a hearing.

 

We did not bow to this wicked form of demand which we see as BLACKMAIL before a hearing and we will go on and on and on and on till these ludicrous references are removed and substantial compensation paid for blackening our name, not only to banking institutions but also to potential future employers.

 

THE FIGHT IS ON not only for us but also for CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE! The fight however we know will not be won but has already been won because JESUS defeated mammon 2000 years ago and WE PROCLAIM THIS VICTORY TODAY IN OUR NATION CONSTITUTIONALLY because the Jesus of Calvary is the GOD of our constitutional acts.

 

Point 30 shows in our view a back off by Mr Moran in his statement that he was not suggesting that the Bank had behaved in an unscrupulous manner.

 

We believe the evidence is to the contrary.

 

Point 31 shows Mr Handyside for the Bank showing their apparent innocence when its comes to keeping to the Governing Principle.

 

We ask and ask this emphaticaly: Is it keeping to the Governing Principle defaulting a customer whose account is in dispute awaiting a hearing. Even in a criminal court the defendent is innocent before being found guilty and being given a criminal record.

 

Here the Bank was threatening in our view Mr McGuffick's ability to trade or get employment if he did not bow to the Bank which in our view was operating as an Egpytian Pharoah holding its slave without the slave having the right to give his side of the story. UNCONSTITUTIONAL we say!

 

Point 32 relates to Mr Handyside taking about the fitness of a person to hold a licence and we intend to report all this to the Office of Fair Trading.

 

We believe the whole scenario here was grossly unfair against Mr. McGuffick and intend to show this to the OFT in our own cases.

 

Point 33 relates to lending decisions under certain criteria.

 

Point 34 gives Mr Handyside stating that the reporting to CRA's was not a coercive tool in the hands of the bank.

 

We disagree because of the impact it has on the person's ability to trade and gain employment, the reporting in these cases going on during periods of dispute. WE DECLARE THE PRACTICE ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the threats clearly issued by banks to get their own way even before liability is established.

 

In Point 35 relates to other members of the family being effected is seemingly denied by Mr Handyside unless the issue relates to a joint account or joint application for credit.

 

The main point is the adverse information of the person in dispute with the Bank. This we present as unfair and if it can be proved that other members of the household in any case have been affected, then we believe legal action should be taken against the institution that has affected the life of an innocent individual.

 

Point 36 relates to a denial from Royal Bank of Scotlkand that it had used the threat of reporting Mr McGuffick's refusal to pay (when in dispute we would argue) to CRA's.

 

We argue that in the cases outlined on this site we have experienced the phenomena of a case being in dispute and banking institutions threatening us, that unless we do what they say they will default us thus preventing us from trading.

 

Is this right, moral and legal before a court hearing. We say this phenomena is highly illegal!

 

If CRA's are there as a means of allowing responsible lending, then how is it they are apparently being use as a threatening tool by banking institutions?

 

Whether non-compliance with Section 77(1) extinguishes the bank's rights

 

Point 37 shows the claimant's counsel Mr Moran giving three propositions in support of the case that it was not open for the Bank to report to CRA's during the period of unenforceability.

 

It is a mystery to us why these propositions were necessary. In our view the Bank was not able to provide the necessary documentation in the prescribed time, and during this time we believe the Bank was guilty of giving a "criminal record" equivalent without the evidence to back it up and without a court hearing to back it up.

 

This seemingly was brought up by Mr Moran in Proposition 1.

 

The understanding of what is meant by "enforceable" is outlined in Proposition 2 whilst Propsition 3 relates to a "default" which clearly enforces an agreement which is unenforceable by the terms of the 1974 Act.

 

All this in our view is ridiculous and more importantly unconstitutional. A court hearing was on the way, a clear dispute was continuing and Royal Bank of Scotland illegally in our view reported to CRA's. Guilty before being found guilty is the state of affairs here in our view!

The McGuffick Case: Reference to Other Cases

 

It seems to be common in legal cases to refer to similar hearings.

 

This is reported in Points 38 to 85.

 

Case 1: Wilson v First County Trust Limited (No2)

 

This seems to refer to the principles of a House of Lords edict presented by Mr Moran for the claimant! Mr Moran declared that the result of this hearing supports the claimant's case but this was challenged by Mr Handyside for the Bank saying the result supports the Bank's case!

 

A Mrs Wilson before the County Court had claimed the loan agreement with First County was unenforceable under the 1974 Act demanding the return of her car which had been given in security. A £250 "document fee" had been added to the loan and at first instance the Judge had founded that the document had been part of the agreement thus making the agreement enforceable.

 

You will see by study of our FIRST PLUS CASE that they added a PPI as part of the loan thus making it a part of the credit agreement.

 

Mrs Wilson on apparently losing the case did not give up! Mrs Wilson appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard in November 2000 and here we have the first reference in the case to European law for Point 40 declares this occurred shortly after the Human Rights Act had come into force. The Court of Appeal held that the document fee was not part of the credit, one of the prescribed terms in the agreement being incorrectly stated, contrary to section 61(1)(a) of the 1974 Act thus making the agreement unenforceable, the car being returned to Mrs Wilson who retained the amount of the loan and the car paying no interest charges.

 

We contend this is the same scenario with First Plus loans where PPI is added onto the loans.

 

Point 41 however gives a further reference to the Court of Appeal with Sir Andrew Morritt VC expressing concern at the outcome considering that it might be arguable that section 127(3) of the Act infringed Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

 

We see this statement as treasonable to the degree of placing European Law above British Law. Since when has there been the starred flag of Europe above Judge's seats. The last time I saw a Judge's seat the crest of H.M. the Queen was above it! Hallelujah! The Crest that shows a nation is still under Christian Constitutional Acts that demand the Monarch (the Judge is the Monarch's representative) suppress foreign infiltrations into our legal processes.

1534 Act of Supremacy brought back into law by Queen Elizabeth I

 

The obligations of this act are as follows:

 

 

1)   Increase in virtue (anointing) of Christ’s Religion. This means being bound to Christ, the present turning away from the real Christ Jesus of the Reformation being completely and absolutely unconstitutional.

 

2) Repress and extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses. The extreme heresy of our National “Church” today has to be repressed.

 

3) The Monarch to act in the line of repressing the extremities that are religiously affecting the nation. This is extremely serious in the context of today for we are seeing a complete breakdown of all that is precious to us.

 

4) To conserve the peace, unity and tranquillity of the realm. Come on! Lets make a stand for we have become a very divided nation with our apparent membership of the E.U. This has brought in Roman Catholics from all over Europe who will vote in a Roman Catholic agenda in our nation which is why the Church of England of which the Monarch is the head on earth must take its stand and take over control of our nation in a Protestant way.

 

5)  To repress the infiltration of foreign laws and systems into our nation.Roman countries use the principles of Corpus Juris that have their origins in Babylon whereas our Protestant system of Habeas Corpus has its origins in Jerusalem, Greece and Protestant Britain. It is obvious to see that the activities of Rome Henry suppressed are coming back. Rome is taking away our freedoms and so those in Christian Ministry today must demand by quoting this act of Supremacy that our Monarch repress as she is obligated to do these infiltrations into our society.

 

Our nation still has a Christian Constitutional Monarch, we are still a Theocracy under God, we still have Christian Constitutional Acts. Foreign infiltration into our legal processes still have to be suppressed with The Monarch's crest above the Judge. We are witnessing foreign infiltration here. We say illegal, unconstitutional and treasonable.

 

Whilst keeping the ancient landmark our father have established in our nation, we would like to ask an additional question?

 

Was the referendum to apparently join Europe a vote for a trading union or a political and legal union?

 

We rest our case on this one!

 

The system has not rested however and in Point 41 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry was brought in and after an adjournment the Court of Appeal gave judgment concluding that 127 (3)  in so far as it prevcents the court from making an enforcement order, is incompatible with article 6(1) of the Covention and with article 1 of the First Protocol to the Covention.

 

So what we are learning from this is that when a case is won under British law, European law (which the Monarch has to suppress) takes precedence over the British act.

 

We are witnessing this in Britain at this time and we are making a stand in the Name of Jesus. We have a Christian Constitutional Monarch with Ministers of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by law" being able to say that European infiltration into our legal processes has to be suppressed!

 

This whole incredible issue that has come into this McGuffick case show the Secretary of State appealing to the House of Lords in Point 42. Trade associations and insurance companies were also represented. Before their Lordships, the primary argument for the government was that the Court had no right to make a declaration of incompatibility!

 

Thank God - in Point 43 the Lords decided the Human Rights Act had no retrospective power but they did not find that for the future cases.

 

We say our constitutional acts apply for yesterday, today and forever!!!!!!!

 

Coming back to the actual McGuffick case,

 

Point 44 shows Mr Moran referring to the Lords judgment (Lord Nicholl's). In Point 45 Mr Moran submitted that where an agreement is improperly executed there is extinguished rights in relation to that loan!

 

Point 46 relates to Lord Nicholl's judgment (paragraph 49) that the 1974 Act renders the "entire agreement inoperative." Indeed Lord Nicholl's judgment in paragraph 72 refers to the lender "losing all his rights under the agreement."

 

Point 47 relates to the infiltration of European law into all of this, the Consumer Credit Act 1974 being incompatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol of European Human Rights legislation.

 

H.M. The Queen is U.K. Head of State who has taken an oath before God that includes all the Constitutional Acts that surround it. She is obligated to suppress this, her representative being the Judge who has the Monarch's crest above his seat.

 

It would seem these legal matters were being won by the claimant under British law and lost under European law.

 

Point 48 has Mr Moran honing in on sections 65 and 127 of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act rather than the European distraction, the point relating to properly executed agreements.

 

Point 49 relates to the findings of Lord Hope of Craighead, section 65 of the 1974 Act being referred to over improperly executed agreements,European Convention rights not being applicable here, point 50 referring to restricted rights of the creditor rather than no rights at all.

 

Point 51 has Mr Handyside for the Bank challenging the notion that this case has authority for the notion of unenforceability in the McGuffick case.

 

This is very interesting for here it would seem that even though the McGuffick case has become a "test case", another test case which would seem to find for the claimant, Mr Handyside challenges.

 

Well if Mr Handyside can challenge the result of the claimant's test case, then we can challenge the result of the McGuffick case which seems to have resulted in thousand of cases being withdrawn from county courts!

 

Points 52 & 53 refers to Lord Nicholl's question of the creditor's right of security, Mr Handyside for the Bank in Point 54 states that section 127 of the 1974 Act does not deprive the agreement of all legal effect but the reality of it all is recognised in the point that the 1974 Act declared the Wilson agreement unenforceable.

 

Context is considered in Points 55 & 56 and the effects of European legistlation, another case (Coister Trust v John Hardman & Co 2008) coming into the fray.

 

Point 58 points out that the House of Lords was divided on the issue over the effect of British Law (section 127 of the 1974 Act) and article 1 of the First Protocol.

 

A simple reading of our constitutional acts would have solved that issue, The Monarch's oath to God being far higher than any politician's signature of giving away our heritage to Europe!

 

Point 59 continue on this point of British law v European law, point 60 showing Mr Handyside rewferring to the concept of as valid contract even if the contract is unenforceable!

 

We put forward that this is a very strange notion indeed!

 

Where we are now with all this and information on Utilitarianism follows:

Where We are At Now: the Legal Position      

 

We stopped paying banks in the time leading up to court hearings, hearings that no longer seem to be taking place.

 

We question the ability of a lower court to wipe out hearings that came about as a result of an edict from the highest court in the land – the House of Lords.

 

We question the references to the European Court of Justice in the now well know McGuffick case which was presented to us by MBNA as a test case apparently proving their position against us. We believe the case actually proves the case for us – for disputes are  legally recognised in the case – thus how can MBNA therefore take enforcement action against us when a court has recognised a dispute? We believe this to be Corpus Juris –illegal under British Constitutional Law.

 

We believe we can prove the illegality of this case as the position given to Protestant Clergymen by H.M. The Queen in her Coronation Oath clearly gives rights and privileges to ensure the Constitutional Acts of 1534, 1689 and 1700 as well as The Elizabethan Settlement is kept to. We do not believe this has occurred with the Mc Guffick Test Case and intend to challenge it even to the Highest Court in the Land – The House of Lords.

 

We do not believe it to be constitutionally right for a defendant to take enforcement action against a claimant before a hearing or do we believe it right to sell on private information to a third party so as to make money out of the claimant. We have received several phone calls from people we don’t know seemingly knowing our personal financial affairs intimately.

 

We do believe there have been treasonable actions taking place here, perverting The Course of Justice as well as complete disregard to previous cases that followed the House of Lords Edict, previous cases that include past clients of MSB Solicitors.

 

2) Introduction

 

There are a number of technical requirements listed relating back to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and we employed MSB Solicitors, Liverpool to check that our now alleged agreements met the demands of this order and the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. Considerable delay occurred in many cases in the banks returning information and it was clear that once Stage Two was reached that the likelihood of validity was unlikely - such was the wording of the House of Lords Order.

 

It is clear that the House of Lords Order resulted in a number of legal firms advertising a service that would wipe out debts without affecting credit rating – indeed enhancing them.

 

Our experience to date is that EMLG credit rating is showing defaults to stay on for 6 years unless the defaults can be taken away. We believe we have a strong case to fight back.

 

On 30 May 2009, however the Daily Mail reported that the Government had stepped in to stop this activity. However, the Lords had issued an Order and that Order is higher than Government Action as the House of Lords is the higher court. We believe our analysis shows reference to the European Court of Justice having influence in all this which we believe to be treasonable under British Constitutional Law.

 

 

MBNA seem to have been very confident of victory, their Vice President intimating to me a great victory for RBofS in the MsGuffick case, the Judge there passing other cases to Manchester. At Manchester all the hearings seem to have been halted – but how can that be? The Lords had issued an Order!!!!!! How can a lower court reject a higher court’s order? To try and answer this we now present points from the McGuffick case that has been analysed here.

 

3) The McGuffick Case

 

Phillip McGUFFICK – Claimant and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Defendant before The Honourable Mr Justice Flaux

 

DISPUTE POINT PROVEN: Consistently Banks had denied there being a dispute (with the exception of Barclaycard) – thus giving them apparent legal rights to take enforcement actions against claimants. Immediately on Page 1 – there is a major error in the case. The report introduction relates the case as being one of a large number of cases in relation to disputes that had occurred between banks and debtors. The Court had recognised disputes here – disputes consistently denied in EMLG cases by banks. Since when in British law has there arisen a situation where one party can default another, affect their ability to trade over a disputed account awaiting a court hearing? We believe this to be global law (Corpus Juris) manifesting in our legal system. Throughout we have paid undisputed accounts – not disputed ones on their way to a hearing. We intend to take this all the way back to the Lords if necessary.

 

To help the Banks here & at the same time prove from the McGuffick case that R B of S  took enforcement action against McGuffick during the time when they did not have signed papers and the account was “irredeemably unenforceable”:

 

All law has to be applied with “law and justice in mercy” and so if there is a delay in finding papers then it can be expected that both parties would discuss this together. We believe MSB Solicitors did this in our cases but still considered seven cases irredeemably unenforceable.  Point 9 of the report covers action by the claimant (like ours) of not paying while the account was in dispute. It is noted that R B of S had received hundreds of requests from solicitors and claims management companies on behalf of clients for documents from the bank in relation to legal action.

 

1689 Act Establishing the Coronation Oath which deals with the application of law in Great Britain: Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to your power cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all your judgements?" King and Queen, "I will." We believe through MSB Solicitors we have offered this to the Banks – but have had enforcement actions against us whilst we were showing mercy.

 

Point 11 intimates the testimony of Clare Price of R B of S who stated that although it was the policy of the bank to keep all copies of loan agreements – it was not always possible to provide them in the prescribed period. It is my recollection in our case that MSB informed us that when the prescribed period was over MSB reminded the bank of their obligations and seemingly did not act on the basis of not meeting the time period. Point 12: It seems R B of S were looking for the agreement when they defaulted the account. Surely the account should have been on hold in this time of dispute instead of going for McGuffick! Point 13: R B of S admitted that they had not issued a signed copy of the agreement during the time period and still defaulted the account! It is admitted that this signed agreement was required by Section 77 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. So why has the case been lost? Point 14: R B of S after considerable delay finds signed agreement which seems to have made the agreement enforceable again under Section 77 (4) but during the time when the account was unenforceable – the Bank defaulted McGuffick. This seems to have been discussed in point 15. Point 17 places doubt by Mr Moran for the claimant that this was not a good test case & in this legal equation there seems to have been in this case a period when the agreement was unenforceable (when the collecting system went against him) and a period when it was enforceable. There was also the added complication of an insurance deal being active in the case which it is not in our cases.

 

The Point Over whether The Credit Deal and the Implications of the deal were properly set out to McGuffick: Point 18 brings to the fore the actual credit deal itself and whether the costs involved were properly set out, point 19 pointing out that in this case there seems to be an understanding of temporary unenforceability but surely it cannot be legal to act against the claimant with a default during the period of unenforceability. The technicalities of the claimant’s case are put forward in Point 19. There is a note in the transcript that the phrase “irredeemably unenforceable” was used by Lord Hoffman (see the link to the House of Lords) in Dimond v Lovell 2002. What is interesting is that a certain Mr. Flaux (an unusual name) was involved in a 2003 appeal that followed this case. Is this the same person as the judge in this case and what position did he take then? The Appeal case was one between Lagden and O’Connor.

 

Appeal Case between Lagden & O’Connor in which it would seem  The Honourable Mr. Justice Flaux was involved. The Case related to a dispute between motor hire companies and motor insurers, the similarity between this case and ones that relate to credit agreements today is whether the demands of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act have been made. In the 2002 Case the agreement was found to be unenforceable – hence the beginning of the use of this phrase. Point 21:   The main issue that had to be resolved in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 was whether the form of agreement which had been used in that case satisfied the requirements of a regulated consumer credit agreement for the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. For reasons that it is not necessary to explain for the purposes of this case where the same difficulty does not arise, the agreement was held to be unenforceable. But one of the points that was argued was whether, even if the claim had been sound, the damages recoverable ought to be limited to the spot hire rate quoted by hirers other than credit hire companies. I

 

In this case a Mr. Flaux took the wider view of the harm placed on the big insurance companies that would have an effect on premiums rather than the individual keeping to the law – this individual decision seemingly being under to the wider view of Mr. Flaux.39.  The view of the majority in Dimond v Lovell was based on their analysis of the law, not on consideration of issues of policy. But Mr Flaux sought to invoke policy considerations in this case in order to support his argument that claims handing charges should not be recoverable under any circumstances. He submitted that, if there were to be a relaxation of the rule that claims handling charges were irrecoverable in the case of the cost of car hire, this would increase the burden of insurance premium payments on the whole community. There was also the prospect of claims handling charges being built into damages claims in other fields as well as that relating to car hire. He pointed out how important it was to distinguish between costs and damages in cases brought in the county court in view of the costs limits that are applied to cases under the small claims track. He submitted that, if the claimant were to be allowed to recover the full cost of the Helphire scheme, that would be tantamount to awarding him costs to which he would not otherwise be entitled. To allow the impecunious to recover claims handling charges as part of their claim of damages would encourage accident management companies to market and direct their services at those of limited means with results that would be undesirable.

 

Utilitarian Position of Mr. Flaux?: A clear view of Mr. Flaux’s perspective on life is shown here, that view clearly to me showing a bias towards the big company and the wider apparent good over the individual keeping of law under the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. This tells me if we are dealing with the same Mr. Flaux here that there is a philosophical bias in the judge based on past statements and actions.It is my view that in the case McGuffick has become the scapegoat of taking the rap for the greater good in that his keeping of law has to be put aside for the greater good of banks ability to operate – something the Royal Bank of Scotland failed to do – they only being in existence because of taxpayers help.

 

Utilitarian Position of U.K. Government who remember are not the Head of State – H.M. The Queen is and the Obligations of Her Office that have been outlined in this report:

 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1189746/Government-leads-crackdown-debt-loophole-swindlers.html#ixzz0fbRv9rs5

 

This Daily Mail article showed Government interference in these cases (even though the Mail seems antagonistic to those taking on the Banks as we did - that is not the point - it show Government behind the scenes activity to suppress an edict of the House of Lords) and so if we can prove this then we can show a Judge might well have been put into place to call for the “greater good” over individual keeping of law. It is clear after the bail out of the banks that if the thousands of cases had gone through giving the now scapegoats compensation and their now alleged debts written off – it could have bankrupted the banks again – involving a further bail out from the taxpayer thus placing the nation under greater debt. This is what I believe has happened in this case which is in my view grossly illegal for these activities clearly “pervert the cause of justice.” Is it worth “perverting the cause of justice” for the nation? I believe that this Mc Guffick case shows the answer to be “yes”! “Greater Good” seems to have taken precedence over justice.

 

UPDATE: 4th. July 2012

 

Today the Daily Mail reports an admission from Bob Diamond that implicate large parts of the establishment including the last Labour Government in rate fixing.

 

We ask if they are guilty of rate fixing - that is stealing from the Public and Business People alike, stealing that has placed many out of their houses and many out of business - then is it not reasonable to ask if this last Labour Government interfered in a string of cases going towards the Courts, cases that have not been heard despite a House of Lords edict - thus defaulting and depriving many Bank Customers of their rightful compensation according to British Law?

 

This is Utilitarianism.

UtilitarianismFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

This article discusses utilitarian ethical theory. For a discussion of John Stuart Mill's book Utilitarianism, see Utilitarianism (book). For the architectural theory, seeUtilitarianism (architecture)

 

Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by itsutility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all sentient beings. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome.

Utilitarianism is often described by the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number of people", and is also known as "the greatest happiness principle". Utility, the good to be maximized, has been defined by various thinkers as happiness or pleasure (versus suffering or pain), although preference utilitarians define it as the satisfaction of preferences. It may be described as a life stance, with happiness or pleasure being ofultimate importance.

 

Utilitarianism can be characterised as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as being a determinant of its moral worth) and virtue ethics (which focuses oncharacter), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism.

 

In general usage, the term utilitarian (Katrin Joost) refers to a somewhat narrow economic or pragmatic viewpoint. Philosophical utilitarianism, however, is a much broader view that encompasses all aspects of people's lives. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

 

Back to the case McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland: in point 20 – the Judge is invited to give guidance in relation to the lender’s refusal to meet the requirements of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. In Point 21 we read Mr Richard Handyside QC urging the court not to embark on such rulings or guidance – this being an inappropriate test case it would seem. There seems to be no disagreement in the case that the Bank had not kept to the terms of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 – yet the Judge founded against the Claimant – we believe because of his utilitarian rather than Constitutional stance.

 

Similar Activity Against McGuffick as we have had to endure: The activity of the Bank R B of S against McGuffick seem to be similar to the actions against EMLG which relate to contractual obligation to pay, the reporting to credit reference agencies during the time of dispute, claimants personal data being given to a third party which we suspect has happened to EMLG due to the large amount of calls from debt management companies, the demands to pay, the issuing of default notices, the threatening of legal action, the instructing to a third party to demand payment.

 

We argue – how can any of this be possible during a dispute on its way to court for had EMLG paid during the dispute – she would have been pre-empting the Court’s decision – and breaking the  principles of British Constitutional Law?

 

Other factors in relation to the activities of McGufficks solicitors came into the equation too – including the signing of agreements etc., consequences of improper execution, fixed sum credit agreements, ineffective securities, enforcement orders, unfair relationships (we regard it grossly unfair that during the time of dispute – disputes recognised by both this court and Barclaycard that creditors should take enforcement action before the court has passed judgment).

 

The Role of Credit Reference Agencies who seemingly have processed adverse information on behalf of defendent banks during times of Dispute leading up to Court Hearings: Under Points 26 to 36 the Court heard of information that is sent to Credit Reference agencies. We regard the activity highly illegal in times of dispute – for since when has it been part of British law for one side to adversely affect the ability of the other side to trade?

 

Under British Constitutional law in times of dispute it would be seen customary for both sides to give their side on the record or await a court hearing. A person with a clean criminal record facing a Crown Court hearing would retain his good character until the moment a jury finds him guilty and the Judge has pronounced the verdict – why should EMLG therefore have a credit criminal record before the Court Hearing?

 

This is an example of Corpus Juris under which legal system a person has to prove his/her innocence which is happening in this case. This is highly treasonable as there is constitutional demand on the Monarch to repress all foreign infiltration into our legal systems.

The Forbidding of Foreign Influence into our legal processes particularly in view of reference to the European Court of Justice in the McGuffick Case.

 

The 1534 Act of Supremacy (still an overriding constitutional requirement thanks to Queen Elizabeth I restoring the Act) strictly forbids foreign influence.

 

Proof:

 

 

1534 ACT OF SUPREMACY. Albeit the king’s Majesty justly and rightfully is and ought to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognized by the clergy of this realm in their convocations, yet nevertheless, for corroboration and confirmation thereof, and for increase of virtue in Christ’s religion within this realm of England, and to repress and extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same, be it enacted, by authority of this present Parliament, that the king, our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England, called Anglicans Ecclesia; and shall have and enjoy, annexed and united to the imperial crown of this realm, as well the title and style thereof, as all honors, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities to the said dignity of the supreme head of the same Church belonging and appertaining; and that our said sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall have full power and authority from time to time to visit, repress, redress, record, order, correct, restrain, and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offenses, contempts and enormities, whatsoever they be, which by any manner of spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be reformed, repressed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained, or amended, most to the pleasure of Almighty God, the increase of virtue in Christ’s religion, and for the conservation of the peace, unity, and tranquillity of this realm; any usage, foreign land, foreign authority, prescription, or any other thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding. 

 

Queen Elizabeth I re-emphasised the point in what became known as her settlement.

 

Proof is in the Oath of the Settlement:

 

I, A. B., do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen’s Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her Highness’s dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, pre-eminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs or successors, or united or annexed to the imperial crown of this realm. So help me God, and by the contents of this Book.

 

The  Act of the Settlement itself began with this very important point:

An acte restoring to the crown the ancient jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical and spiritual and abolishing all foreign power repugnant to the same.

 

The Coronation Oath of our present Monarch (established under the 1689 Act) goes along the same theme.

 

Proof:

 

III. The archbishop of bishop shall say, “Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this Kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same?” 
The King and Queen shall say, “I solemnly promise so to do.” 


Archbishop or bishop, “Will you to your power cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all your judgements?” 
King and Queen, “I will.” 


Archbishop or bishop, “Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?” 
King and Queen, “All this I promise to do.” 


After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand upon the holy Gospels, shall say, 


King and Queen, “The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God.” 


Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

 

It is a legal fact that our Constitutional laws are higher than global legal processes and even actions by the U.K. Government. It is also a fact that clergymen of the Protestant Reformed Religion have been given rights to ensure they are kept to – these rights being for the benefit of everyone including Roman Catholics, Muslims, Hindus – whoever – as the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law is one of love towards one’s neighbour – not of oppression.

 

The laws and customs mentioned in the Oath are of course linked to the Constitutional Acts of 1534, Elizabeth I, the 1700 Act of Settlement as well as this 1689 Act Establishing the Coronation Oath. They are well above global banking systems that in our view are under Corpus Juris and are high above what we see as the Epicurean stance of the Judge, the philosophy coming out of this judgment clearly being utilitarian.

 

Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by itsutility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all sentient beings. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome.

 

Utilitarianism is often described by the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number of people", and is also known as "the greatest happiness principle". Utility, the good to be maximized, has been defined by various thinkers as happiness or pleasure (versus suffering or pain), although preference utilitarians define it as the satisfaction of preferences. It may be described as a life stance, with happiness or pleasure being ofultimate importance.

 

Utilitarianism can be characterised as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as being a determinant of its moral worth) and virtue ethics (which focuses oncharacter), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism.

 

In general usage, the term utilitarian (Katrin Joost) refers to a somewhat narrow economic or pragmatic viewpoint. Philosophical utilitarianism, however, is a much broader view that encompasses all aspects of people's lives. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

 

Further Analysis of the Utilitarian stance: This philosophy was embraced by Epicurus and extended by Jeremy Bentham who viewed pain and pleasure as the ruling values of the World. From this he produced the rule of utility which we believe Mr Justice Flaux has acted upon in giving a decision (despite of law being to the contrary) of the greatest good for the vast majority of people. With all the thousands of cases in the system awaiting debt write-offs and compensations and legal fees to be paid – if he had founded by law it could well have placed banks awaiting a further government bail –out – that bail – out resulting in greater financial strain on the taxpayer and so we believe Mr Justice Flaux has founded for the “greater good”!

 

 

 Other Cases brought up in the Hearing & Mr Justice Flaux reference to European Law: The effect of other cases were considered by Mr Justice Flaux in points 38 to 93 in which various interpretations were given from previous cases including interpretation of the House of Lords edict in points 69 -70 but what is more alarming under British law is the reference to European law (Corpus Juris) and the European Court of Justice in points 94-97. There is also a reference to “member states” but it has to be remembered that the Head of the Legal system in Britain is H.M. The Queen. It is her crest that would have been above the Judge – not the crest of the European Union in which Britain has no constitutional membership (remember the referendum to join was into a Common Trading Union – not a political and legal union.)

 

 

Have the Constitutional Principles been applied in this case by Mr. Justice Flaux or has there been foreign influences over our Legal Processes?Remember the Elizabethan Settlement which our present Monarch is still under as is Mr Justice Flaux who is the Queen’s representative in court. Interesting that within the constitutional acts clergymen are given rights to ensure they are kept to. As a clergyman I will be ensuring they are and that the clear Edict of the House of Lords is kept to.

 

I, A. B., do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen's Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her Highness's dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen's Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, pre-eminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the Queen's Highness, her heirs or successors, or united or annexed to the imperial crown of this realm. So help me God, and by the contents of this Book.

 

Data Protection Act: In Points 106 to 116 the Data Protection Act is intimated, we in the Griffiths family wanting to know how it is we get phone calls from various parts of the World seeming to know all about our apparent financial circumstances. We strongly suspect our private information has been sold onto other agencies and as it is our information – we would like the proceeds of this criminal activity.

 

Poor Mr. McGuffick?: It is not surprising Mr. Justice Flaux in Point 118 rejected poor Mr. McGuffick’s claim which in our view he needs to return to a court properly operating under the Constitutional Acts of Great Britain.

 

Rich Mr. McGuffick can be grateful to the fact that H.M. The Queen cannot sign away to Europe what she swore before God in her Coronation Oath of 1953 in which clergymen are given powers to ensure that these Constitutional Principles of this Oath, the Act of Supremacy of 1534, the Elizabethan Settlement and the 1700 Act of Settlement are kept to. H.M. the Queen and what she has sworn along with the Constitutional Obligation of the stated acts are overruling acts over the influences of global legal systems and the U.K. Government.

 

Suggested Way Forward: There is clearly obligation on the Nation to repent before God for allowing a situation like this one to occur. A nation can work together again as long as it adheres to its landmark. The bowing down to Europe and attempts to combine British legal protocol with Corpus Juris is causing havoc to us all.

Word from the Lord through David P Griffiths, 28/12/12

“THE CHRISTIAN STATE & THE TOTALITARIAN STATE”

 

“I am very concerned in Britain that the nation is suppressing the people to behave under the auspices of a global totalitarian world. In this, free speech is supressed. In this, the ability to defend in a court is taken away; and what happened at the Olympics was a handing over to powers who had looked to take over Britain for some time. These powers look to change Britain into a totalitarian state; a state where people can no longer make their choices, for they will be forced to bow down to the god of this world, rather than the God of heaven.

 

“The monarch has failed in her obligation to uphold the Protestant religion established by law, as she said she would do in her oath to God. This failure has come due to a bowing down by government to a global legal structure, rather than the one that came about through the Protestant Reformation, which she promised to uphold. The Elizabethan Settlement seems such a long way away now; but the freedoms the nation has enjoyed through it are still available for those who make a stand for the Christiannation, rather than the totalitarian one.

 

“Those who plot to remove the Constitution of thy nation must be brought to account; for this is high treason, to remove all the auspices of the nation’s Constitution, so as to give power to the gods of the Olympics, rather than the God of heaven to whom the Queen swore.

 

“The nation is under a curse, of breaking its promises towards God; and because of that curse, the God of heaven demands full adherence to the One who took the curse for the nation, if the nation would only repent. Repent of the innocents being slaughtered from the womb, id the very first step. Repent of the lying together of man with man, rather than embracing the Ephesians 5 model. Repent of the way elderly people, disabled people, are treated in the context of removing from them the ability to follow God. The removal for the elderly people to pass on the faith to the younger generations, and to the disabled people, the widespread use of the cures of the occult, rather than the healing power of Jesus Christ.

 

“Yet the nation goes through its festivals and days, and observance of days, which mean nothing to Almighty God. What makes the angels rejoice, is a man accepting Jesus Christ as his Lord and Saviour; of a woman bowing the knee to the King of Kings and Lord of Lords; and of a child being taught the faith and Constitution of the land. On putting these matters right, we can then look at Britain being prosperous once more, and having a world-wide position, with its own manufacturing base, rather than having to bow down to totalitarian rulers, with their global brands and infiltrations.

 

“You have observed the coming in of foreign systems into the courts of the land. Your work in correcting the courts is vital; for unless the court upholds the meaning of the crest above the judge’s seat, then each conviction is void, because of the lack of adherence to the monarch’s promise to God.

 

“Totalitarianism; or the Protestant religion established by law. Totalitarianism, and the god of this world, versus the blood-releasing power of God, of a Saviour who shed His blood to enable man to be set free from the powers of a totalitarian state.”

CONSUMER CREDIT ACTS

and related LAW of Great Britain by Rev  David P Griffiths 

 

This presentation particularly relates to the many thousands of cases in U.K. that were affected by a House of Lords edict that was given in relation to procedures operated by banking institutions. Serious question was given in this edict in relation to the way banking institiutions were operating their administration.

 

This edict came within the context of a nation that clearly had banking institutions that operated with what we see as unfair contracts benefitting themselves rather than the well being of the nation.

 

Our charitables actions here are on behalf of the many businesses lost because of unfair contracts and the ridiculous high interest rates and hidden practices that are now coming to light in the time of recession in the nation. We believe it is the time of God's judgment upon a nation that has bowed down to mammon rather than the God of its Christian Constitutional Acts.

 

In one particular area, much of the work in relation to pre-2007 apparent credit  agreements seems to have been cancelled out by a Court Hearing conducted by the Honourable Mr Justice Flaux, his apparent Utilitarian stand and unconstitutional references to European Law and the European Court of Justice seemingly winning the day for the banking institutions.

 

I am simply fulfilling my Constitutional Right as an Ordained Minister of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law to challenge this High Court hearing on Constitutional Grounds, H.M. The Queen being Head of State in Great Britain. She swore to God to give me this right of challenge.

 

Following is Part of the 1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath, the promises in the oath being  sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

 

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?" 

 

King and Queen, "All this I promise to do." 

 

After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand upon the holy Gospels, shall say, 


King and Queen, "The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God." 

 

Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

 

In examining modern Acts of Parliament is is my role as an ordained Minister of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law" to ensure that these laws are perfectly in line with our Constitutional Acts featured on this website. It is also my role to see that they are applied properly.

 

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?" 

 

A landmark has clearly been established with our Constitutional Monarchy, there being a clear role for Clergy in the British Legal system. This is why British Clergymen often wear Barristerial tabs. John Wesley, founder of the Methodists did this and I intend to do the same so that British Constitutional Justice is once more common practice in our nation.

This is why God has given me opportunity in the Courts system and the Political Arena that has included high profile presentations fighting for our Constitution to be restored. This is CONSTITUTIONAL - not POLITICAL ACTION! I point this out as this website is about charitable and constitutional presentations, not an opportunity for political point scoring.

 

Indeed as members of political parties at the 2010 Clwyd West Constituency General Election count at Venue Cymru will tell you, I was there mixing with politicians and the Press talking on constitutional points and matters relating to the state of our nation above the vagrancies of personal promotion. We fight to proclaim Christ's Lordship and it is my right as a Protestant Reformed Religion to Minister to make this stand, and publicise it here so as to restore our Christian Heritage.

 

In my speech at Venue Cymru  I congratulated sitting MP David Jones for his excellent ethical stand in Parliament and for signing the Westminster Confession. I shared my stand with Labour Candidate Donna Hutton and her agent.  I witnessed to Labour Party activists about this and they asked me to join them! I was embraced by Conservatice Party supporters including the wife of David Jones agreeing with what I said.

 

I had chats with the UKIP and Independent candidates sharing on all this. I did not receive antagonism. I believe all parties need to come together and declare allegiance to our Constitution.

 

Get it! This is CONSTITUTIONAL - not POLITICAL ACTIVITY and so I know I can legally share this here on this charitable site.

In cases  I am dealing with in our nation however I am finding references to global and European law that have no place in our Protestant Legal System Established by law. The Judge is obligated by law to give no heed to European examples but give every attention to edicts of the House of Lords, the House of Bishops and to H.M. The Queen who has sworn an oath as to the way cases in Britain are to be conducted.

 

It is why with my study on modern acts, I read them with the eye of the over-riding constitutional acts demanding that every action taken in courts comes in line with our Constitutional heritage and in the case of consumer and banking matters, it is clear mammon has taken over.

 

It is our role to re-establish the God of our Constitutional Acts as Lord over our Nation.

 

I really believe it is the time of compensation for victims of banking practices alien to our Constitutional Acts and as we will show in this section alien to modern acts too. It is clear that compensation is the priority above bankers bonuses, the bonus to many bankers alone being higher than the salary of our own Prime Minister.

 

It is the crest of H.M. The Queen that stands above every seat of judgment in Britain and this crest represents all she has sworn in her Coronation Oath and represents all the great heritage of our nation written in our Great Constitutional Acts. It is this heritage we stand on.

As a Clergymen of Great Britain I am applying the Word of God that H.M. the Queen swore on in 1953

and the demand that is contained therein that landmarks are not to be removed.

This examination is on the following Acts of Parliament:

 

1)  Administration of Justice Act 1970

 

2)  Consumer Credit Act 1974

 

3)  Protection from Harassment Act 1997

 

4)  Consumer Credit Act 2006

 

There will be reference to legal practice in relation to Perverting the Course of Justice and in the keeping and honouring of our Protestant Constitutional Acts that are featured on this website.

 

1)  Administration of Justice Act 1970

 

Under Part V of this administration, Section 40  shows that an offence is committed if one harasses a person with demand for payment if that harassment is calculated to subject the individual or his/her family to alarm, distress or humiliation.

 

As you will see from the individual cases shown on this website, we put forward we have experienced this while we have been in the process of taking a banking institution to court. Our presentation of harassment is one we ask the nation to consider. We understand the importance of prompt bill paying. What we do not understand is continued harassment particularly early morning when one is either resting or getting the house ready for the day on an account in dispute.

 

We believe we have experienced calculated harassment that has continued despite of our pleading of a case on its way to court, the calculation we believe being to grind you down.

 

2)  Consumer Credit Act 1974

 

To be compliant with the 1974 Act lenders must fulfil administrative procedures laid out in Sections 62 & 63. There is clear obligation to keep the paperwork to a given criteria as indeed section 86b  relates to notices that have to be given.

 

Section 88 relates to "default notices" that have to specify the nature of an alleged breach.

 

All this is crucial in relation to cases presented on this site. Great Britain's law has traditionally been one that embraces the principle of being innocent before one is proven guilty in a Court of Law.

 

From the cases presented on this site we can show that banking institutions have in our view not practiced the principle presented in the 1974 act which refers to an "alleged" breach rather than an actual. What right therefore has a banking institution got in "defaulting" a client who is taking the institution to court to have a judgment on the validity of the account?

 

This is surely deciding guilt thus pre-empting a court hearing. We believe we are presenting on this site operations of banking institutions breaking not only modern law but hitting at the heart of a legal system that has always used the principles of Habeas Corpus.

 

We have one particular case presented on this site that relates to an unfair contract, Section 137 of this act allowing a Court to re-open the credit agreement to do justice between the parties.

 

We believe this to be particularly important for all those who had unfair contracts imposed where all the advantage is given to one side, the application of law in these incidences being one of the letter rather than the spirit. This comes against the constitutional injunction to apply law with "law and justice in mercy." Apply law this way most certainly does not seem to have been the case with First Plus whose agreements we expose on this site.

 

We certainly would welcome open court to bring a sensible arrangement but what has to be remembered is the excessive pressure being placed on people by a company that advertised "Life is For Living"!

 

Sub section (2) relates "credit agreements" to meaning any agreement.

 

Section 159 gives rights to the individual when it come to false entries on credit files. What is strange in cases presented on this site is the insistence of banking institutions saying how they must keep to their processes of operation. It is as if they are programmed to default anyone at certain time whatever the circumstances of the case.

 

We put forward that in criminal law a court has to decide whether an individual has a criminal record. This occurs after that individual is found guilty by a court. Under the law of banking institutions it would seem that even when they are being taken to court they can in effect black list an individual for non-payment even when that payment is being held back whilst waiting for a court hearing on an account. We declare this practice to be unconstitutional, there being three options in the 1974 Act for the Credit Reference Agency to adopt.

 

1)  Remove the entry from the file;

 

2)  Amend the entry or

 

3)  Take no action

 

Declaring defaults on disputed accounts on their way to court we present as illegal.

 

3)  Protection from Harassment Act 1997

 

This act prohibits harassment of another and we have proof of continued harassment of banking institutions against us at a time when we were taking them to court.

 

We believe Section 1, sub section 1 of this act can be applied to banking institutions who seemed to be determined to get their own way whatever the cost.

 

There is an allowance in the act for the victim to take civil proceedings against those causing the harassments and we hold detailed logs of such harassment from banking institutions.

 

4)  Consumer Credit Act 2006

 

This Act removed the financial limit for the regulation of consumer credit in Section 2, part 16. Section 7 relates to the giving of statements whilst Section 8 puts an onus on the OFT to prepare information sheets on arrears and defaults that give debt management options.

 

Section 15 refers to the enforceability of regulated agreements, the 1974 act giving discretion on courts whether to enforce an agreement. There is a reference in the 2006 act to the 1974 act Section 127 (3) and (20) to the provision given to a court not to make an enforcement order on a consumer credit or hire agreement.

 

Section 127(3) of the 1974 act relates to agreements that needed to be signed in a prescribed manner to enable an agreement to be enforceable. It is clear from cases we are presenting on this site that the banking institutions in question were not able to show to solicitors signed documents set out in the prescribed manner of the 1974 act and whilst  this was being ascertained the very same banking institutions took enforcement act action against us, individuals who were holding out to see if the institutions could produce such evidence.

 

We see the enforcement action of the institutions against us at a time when this was going through the legal processes as being illegal.

 

The 2006 Act also deals with the issue of unfair deals, a court being able to decide whether the relationship of the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement is fair. We believe in the First Plus case the original "agreement" that bears no relation as to how the product was sold is so weighted towards First Plus that the agreement is designed to go on forever!

 

Section 46 particularly deals with unfairness with a very important statement:

 

A relationship may be unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following:

 

+  any of the terms of the agreement or any related agreement;

 

+  the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement;

 

+  any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (whether occurring before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement.)

 

The part written in a bold font here is particularly interesting as this relates to the way the law is applied and this is highly correct constitutionally.

 

We believe that we on this site are presenting enforcement actions that are illegal both by Constitutional and Modern law.

 

5) Other Related Acts

 

www.inbrief.co.uk gives an answer to the question, What is perverting the course of justice?

 

Perverting the course of justice is an English common law crime involving one of a number of actions which are designed to interfere with the administration of justice.......

 

In order to pervert the course of justice any one of three acts may be carried out: These are:

 

i)  Intimidating or threatening a case witness or juror.

 

As regards to the cases presented on this site, there clearly has been intimidation against an individual taking an institution to a court hearing. The In Brief website defines intimidation as making threats to harm someone, acts to harm them, physical and financial harm   .... etc.

 

We certainly endured serious intimidation in the cases we present that included threats of financial harm. In the case of MBNA I was told simply that they always win in court. Well, that is no excuse for intimidating an individual taking them to court for a hearing. It was to be the decision of the Judge in this individual case that was to count, and this form of intimidation to back off we present as illegal. We believe this was an example of attempting to pervert the course of justice by intimidating us to back off. Instead we have got stronger!

 

ii)  Intimidating or threatening a judge.

 

iii)  Disposing of or fabricating of evidence.

 

We also see that the act of changing identity to harass an individual taking another to court as being another example of "Perverting the Course of Justice". 

 

www.thisismoney.co.uk website had a post dated 04 01 08 that related to Mercers Debt Collection Agency. We had the misfortune too in dealing with this agency that the poster declares belongs to Barclaycard. Barclaycard is one of the institutions that really went for us whilst we were on the road to taking them to court.

 

One of their methods of harassment was to use Mercers with continuous harassment and we believe if it can be proven that Mercers does belongs to Barclays then they will have in effect changed their identity towards a person taking them to court.

 

This whole system of banking has miserably failed over many years. It is time to return to the local bank manager who knows you, your family as is part of a local community.

 

The present system simply dhas not worked and we need to return to British law and not allow infiltration in our way of life from European and Global legal systems.

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